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Labeled by one lawmaker as “the worst financial product out there,”1 the
payday loan drives many borrowers into long-term debt because the borrowers
cannot repay a high-cost loan in a short time frame and in a single payment, as
required by the typical loan contract.2 Consequently, many borrowers suffer
serious financial harm, including lacking money to pay monthly bills,
experiencing disconnection of utility services, and even being forced to file for
bankruptcy relief.3

1. 151 CONG. REC. E1386 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Luis Gutierrez).
Similarly, some Republicans have called payday lenders loan sharks and predatory lenders. See,
e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7981 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter)
(identifying members of Congress who urged passage of legislation to protect the troops from
payday lending and thanking “all of them for their great work and also to the gentleman [Robert
Simmons (R-CT)] for his hard work on payday lender and trying to make sure that our troops
have a good situation now and will not be the victims of loan sharks”); 152 CONG. REC. S6406
(daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of Sen. James Talent) (“[P]redatory payday lenders are
targeting American troops and are trying to make a buck off of their service to our country. . . . I
recognize that payday lending can be a risky business, but a triple-digit interest rate, which is
commonly charged today, is simply too much.”).
2. See, e.g., JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S.
PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY
LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 6 (2001), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf (finding that payday loans are a coercive
practice that require repayment of the principal in a short period of time and lead to long-term
indebtedness).
3. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday
Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011). One academic conducted a comparative study
of households in states with and without access to payday loans over a five-year period,
eventually concluding that access to payday loans “increases households’ difficulty in paying
mortgage, rent and utilities bills” and positing, though not as strongly, that such access
“increase[s] the likelihood of delaying needed medical care, dental care and prescription drug
purchases.” Id.; see, e.g., DENNIS CAMPBELL, ASÍS MARTÍNEZ JEREZ & PETER TUFANO,
BOUNCING OUT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INVOLUNTARY BANK
ACCOUNT CLOSURES 2, 39 (2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/cprc/
conferences/2008/payment-choice/papers/campbell_jerez_tufano.pdf (finding that payday
borrowing increases the risk of involuntary bank-account closures); Michael S. Barr, Jane Dokko
& Ben Keys, Financial Services, Savings, & Borrowing Among Low- and Moderate-Income
Households, Presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Conference on the
Community Reinvestment Act 2, 21–22 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/
research/Conferences/2009/2-6-2009/Keys_presentation.pdf (comparing low- to moderateincome payday borrowers in the Detroit metropolitan area with similar households that did not
use payday loans and finding that payday borrowers were twice as likely to be evicted, three
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Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) created the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (CFPB), which has regulatory authority to protect consumers from
payday lending.4 However, several Republican lawmakers have taken actions
aimed to put the CFPB, America’s first consumer financial watchdog, on a
tight leash.5 Those actions include introducing a series of bills intended to
weaken the CFPB’s overall power6 and to reduce its funding.7 For example,
one proposed bill would replace the CFPB’s current leadership structure of one
director with a five-member bipartisan commission.8
Besides to proposing bills to limit the CFPB’s effectiveness, Republicans in
the U.S. Senate successfully blocked one vote to confirm a director for the
times as likely to file for bankruptcy, and almost three times more likely to have utility service
disconnected).
4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act (DoddFrank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011, 1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 1980 (2010) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5512 (Supp. IV 2010)).
5. See infra notes 7–8.
6. See Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. app. at 81, 88 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing]
(testimony of Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (discussing four
bills that, according to Professor Levitin, would hinder the CFPB’s effectiveness before it even
began exercising its regulatory authority); see also 157 CONG. REC. H5326 (daily ed. July 21,
2011) (statement of Rep. Mazie K. Hirono) (opposing the proposed Consumer Financial
Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011 because it “seeks to limit the
independence and effectiveness of the CFPB”).
7. See Financial Services and Central Governmental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2434, 112th
Cong. §§ 101–102 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 8 (2011). For example, Representative Jo
Ann Emerson, Chairwoman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services,
introduced a bill to cap the CFPB’s funding for the 2012 fiscal year and to place further funding
under the purview of the congressional appropriations process. See H.R. 2434, §§ 101–102.
Currently, the CFPB’s funding falls outside Congress’s reach because the Federal Reserve funds
CFPB’s operations, and the yearly funding is capped at approximately 10% of the Federal
Reserve’s total operating expenses. Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(1), (2)(A); see also Legislative
Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 83 (testimony of Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown
University Law Center) (explaining that the CFPB “has less budgetary independence than any
other federal bank regulator” because of this cap). An additional proposed bill would facilitate a
panel of financial regulators’ ability to reverse any CFPB regulations by reducing the required
veto vote from two-thirds of the panel members to a simple majority. See Consumer Financial
Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. § 102
(2011). But see Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 85 (testimony of Professor Adam
J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (arguing that H.R. 1315 “provides an unnecessary
and possibly unconstitutional check on the CFPB and should be eliminated”).
8. Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, H.R. 1121, 112th
Cong. § 2 (2011). But see Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 6, at 83 (testimony of
Professor Adam J. Levitin, Georgetown University Law Center) (recommending that House
representatives vote against the bill because “switching to a five-member panel would tilt the
balance at the agency to gridlock and inaction, would add unnecessary big government bloat, and
would reduce accountability”).
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Bureau.9 As was widely reported, these lawmakers refused to confirm Richard
Cordray as director not for lack of qualification, but to “force structural
changes to the agency.”10 In response, President Barack Obama used his
executive power to appoint Mr. Cordray as the director during a Senate
recess.11 Amid threats from the financial-services industry to challenge the
legality of his appointment,12 Mr. Cordray, taking cue from President Obama,13
is rightfully focusing his attention on all financial entities engaged in payday
lending.14
At the first field hearing as director, Mr. Cordray announced that the CFPB
had begun examination of non-bank lenders and released guidelines for
examination procedures.15 Non-bank payday lenders16 are snubbing their
noses at state lawmakers by continuing to offer loans in circumvention of state
laws.17 Payday lenders charge fees that equate to triple-digit annual interest

9. See Laura Meckler & Victoria McGrane, Obama Picks Nominee Fight, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020351360457714099078506343
0.html.
10. See, e.g., id.
11. David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer
Post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1.
12. See Kate Davidson, Citi on CFPB: Lawsuits ‘Likely to Come From Every Quarter’, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_8/citi-lawsuitscfpb-1045627-1.html?zkPrintable=true. The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Justice
Department released a memorandum that explained the recess-appointment process and
concluded that President Obama’s appointment was legal. See Memorandum from Virginia A.
Seitz, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Lawfulness of Recess Appointments
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions 17–18 (Jan. 6,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf.
13. Ylan Q. Mui, Obama Praises Consumer Bureau, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2012, at A11
(quoting President Obama as stating that “irresponsible debt collectors and payday lenders and
independent mortgage servicers and loan providers . . . are bound by the same rules as everybody
else”).
14. See Maya Jackson Randall, Consumer Bureau Targets Payday Loans, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020430140457717100106677
2154.html (quoting Cordray as telling a crowd in Birmingham, Alabama that payday loans will be
given “much more attention” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. Id. Mr. Cordray also announced the release of Short-Term, Small-Dollar Lending
Procedures, which CFPB examiners will use when they visit banks and non-banks to assess their
payday loan operations. Id. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, EXAMINATION
PROCEDURES: SHORT-TERM, SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING PROCEDURES, available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Short-Term-Small-Dollar-endingExamination-Manual.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
16. In this Article, “non-bank payday lenders” refers to those institutions that fall outside of
the mainstream financial institutions, such as banks and credit unions. Cf. REBECCA BORNÉ ET
AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BIG BANK PAYDAY LOANS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/big-bank-payday-loans.pdf
(distinguishing non-bank payday-loan lenders and mainstream banks).
17. See infra Part II.A.1–4 (explaining the four methods payday lenders have used to avoid
state regulation).
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rates, issue loans frequently in excess of the borrower’s next paycheck, and
require borrowers to repay the loans in a single balloon payment—usually in
two weeks.18 Payday loans are considered so predatory that several states have
banned payday lending or have capped the annual percentage rate (APR) at
36% or less.19
To stop payday lenders from skirting state laws, this Article asserts that the
CFPB should exercise its rulemaking authority to declare many payday loan
practices as unfair, deceptive, abusive, and, consequently, unlawful.20 Part I
explains how payday lending ensnares the majority of borrowers in a debt trap.
For instance, because large repayment amounts are due within a short time
frame, the majority of payday borrowers cannot repay the entire loan on time
and thus must pay multiple rollover fees to extend the due date or obtain
additional consecutive loans.21 Part I also describes how some payday lenders
repeatedly debit borrowers’ bank accounts to collect rollover fees and thereby
force borrowers to close their bank accounts to stop these rapacious collection
activities.22
Part II describes the schemes non-bank payday lenders use to avoid state-law
restrictions on payday loans. To circumvent the definition of a payday loan or
to avoid being classified as an entity regulated by payday-loan statutes, payday
lenders tweak their loan products, masquerade as different types of financial
institutions, partner with Native American tribes, obtain different lending
licenses to operate, or drop their licenses altogether.23
After discussing non-bank lenders, Part II moves on to describe the role of
mainstream financial institutions in payday lending. As uncovered in a recent
report surveying four states, major banks finance 42% of non-banks’ payday
lending.24 Major banks, such as Wells Fargo, also offer their own versions of
payday loans, usually under the misnomer of “direct deposit advances,” which
18. Jean Ann Fox, Safe Harbor for Usury: Recent Developments in Payday Lending,
ADVANCING CONSUMER INT., Fall/Winter 1999–Spring/Summer 2000, at 7, 7.
19. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (capping
short-term loan APRs at 25%).
20. The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB authority to prevent financial-service providers
from “committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice.” Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)).
21. See, e.g., URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL
QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY
FEES EVERY YEAR 3, 4 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/paydaylending/research-analysis/rr012exec-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf (stating that rollover fees
extend a loan’s due date).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See NICHOLAS BIANCHI, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION, PROFITING FROM POVERTY: HOW
PAYDAY LENDERS STRIP WEALTH FROM THE WORKING-POOR FOR RECORD PROFITS 12 (2012),
available at http://www.npa-us.org/files/images/profiting_from_poverty_npa_payday_loan_
report_jan_2012_0.pdf.
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are only available to customers who arrange for direct deposit of their income
checks.25 These bank-issued loans have triple-digit interest rates and short
maturity dates, require single balloon payments, and give banks unfettered
access to the borrowers’ bank accounts.26 Therefore, these bank-issued loans
are not meaningfully distinguishable from non-bank payday loans because they
have the same predatory characteristics and, therefore, need to be regulated.27
Part III describes the CFPB’s broad rulemaking authority over all financial
institutions and its enforcement authority over regular non-bank payday
lenders as well as large financial institutions.28 However, the CFPB lacks
enforcement authority over smaller financial institutions; therefore, this Article
posits that the CFPB can, and should, use its various powers to persuade
prudential regulators of smaller financial institutions to exert enforcement
authority over them to secure their compliance with the herein proposed
regulations.29
25. See JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., BANK PAYDAY LOAN PRODUCTS 1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/CFA%20-%20Bank%20Direct
%20Deposit%20Payday%20Loan%20Products,%20Aug.%203,%202009.pdf;
Alex
Ulam,
Consumer Groups Call N.Y. Plan an Invitation to Usury, AM. BANKER, Jun. 2, 2011,
http://www.nedap.org/documents/2011-06-02AmericanBanker.pdf.
26. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY LOANS SPREADING 1 (2011)
[hereinafter NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY LOANS SPREADING], available
at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/ib_bank_payday_
spreading.pdf (reporting that bank-issued payday loans are spreading and specifically identifying
Regions Bank as the most recent large bank to offer payday loans). Unless otherwise indicated,
“mainstream financial institutions” includes banks and credit unions, whereas “non-banks” refers
to the typical payday lender, as well as companies masquerading as other entities to avoid state
law. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON: HOW THE GOVERNMENT’S PUSH
FOR DIRECT DEPOSIT OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPOSES SENIORS TO PREDATORY BANK LOANS 16
(2010) [hereinafter NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON], available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/runaway-bandwagon.pdf (explaining why bank-issued
payday loans “look just like payday loans”).
27. See Ulam, supra note 25; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY
LOANS SPREADING, supra note 26, at 1 (explaining how bank-issued payday loans have “the
same dangerous features of traditional payday loans that make them unaffordable and lead to a
debt trap”); Maya Jackson Randall & Alan Zibel, Banks’ Direct-Deposit Advances Spark Lending
Debate, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311
1904006104576502793158420916.html (reporting the story of a borrower who had experience
with non-bank payday loans from six lenders and a direct-deposit loan from U.S. Bank, who
stated that based on her experience, “the [U.S. Bank loan is] the same as any [non-bank] payday
loan”).
28. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1025(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1990 (2010)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (Supp. IV 2010)). The Dodd-Frank Act defines large
financial institutions as those institutions having more than $10 billion in assets. Id.; see also
Adam Belz, Iowa Community Bankers Worry New Regulations Could Bind Them, DES MOINES
REG., Aug. 7, 2011, at 1D, available at 2011 WLNR 15619427 (reporting that the nation’s largest
banks control 79% of the financial markets, whereas smaller financial institutions control only
11%).
29. See infra Part III.A; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(24)(A)–(B) (identifying the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the prudential regulator for insured depository
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Part III explains how the CFPB should exercise its rulemaking authority to
declare that several payday-loan practices are unfair, deceptive, and abusive.
Such declarations would be similar to a federal law that restricts payday
lending by bank and non-bank lenders to military personnel in several ways,
including capping the APR at 36% on loans to active-duty military members
and their dependents.30 Although the CFPB is explicitly prevented from
establishing a national usury limit,31 it should pass a regulation making it
unlawful for any lender to charge an interest rate in violation of applicable
laws.
Part III also asserts that the CFPB should establish regulations that define
payday loans and expand the scope of regulated entities to address the growing
trend of lenders using ruses to avoid applicable laws.32 Additionally, it should
declare the following practices as unfair, deceptive, or abusive: short maturity
dates, single balloon payments, multiple rollover or refinancing fees, multiple
back-to-back loans, and repetitive electronic bank-account access. These
practices mislead many consumers and cause them to enter into financial
transactions under terms they cannot hope to fulfill, thus destining them to
suffer substantial economic injury.
The CFPB’s imposition of restrictions on payday loans will not end
short-term, small-dollar loans in America, but will cause an increased
prevalence of responsible lending practices. The results of a recent pilot
program implemented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
demonstrate that lenders can issue small-dollar loans subject to the types of
restrictions proposed above and still achieve long-term profitability.33
Therefore, the CFPB’s regulatory intervention will correct the continuing
market failure by promoting profitable, yet fair loans by responsible lenders.
I. THE DEBT TRAP OF PAYDAY LOANS
When payday loans—also known as payday advances, deferred-deposit
loans, or cash-advance loans—emerged over twenty years ago,34 the
payday-loan industry claimed that they were a short-term financial solution for

institutions and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) as the prudential regulator for
insured credit unions); id. § 1026(a) (defining smaller financial institutions as those with $10
billion or less in assets).
30. John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, sec.
670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006)).
31. Id. § 1027(o).
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. Rae-Ann Miller et al., A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot
Program, 4 FDIC Q. 28, 28 fig.1, 32 (2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical
/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_SmallDollar.pdf.
34. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 9–10 (2002).
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families low on cash.35 However, consumer advocates quickly recognized that
payday loans were, and still are, a financially destructive form of short-term
credit.36 The fees charged to obtain a payday loan usually amount to APRs
totaling several hundred percent and some payday loans today even have APRs
exceeding 1000%; consequently, payday loans are one of the most expensive
forms of credit available.37 In addition to the astronomical APRs associated
with payday loans, other problematic loan terms, such as short maturity dates
and single balloon payments, trap many individuals in a financial nightmare
from which it is very difficult to escape.38 As discussed below, the
payday-loan industry’s business model and practices depend on ensnaring
consumers via repetitive access to their bank accounts and multiple rollovers
and loans.39
A. Electronic Access to Consumers’ Bank Accounts Facilitate the Debt Trap
In the early days of the industry, a consumer obtained a payday loan by
physically going to a store, presenting identification and proof of income, and
giving the store clerk a post-dated personal check totaling the amount of the
loan plus fees.40 The consumer was then required to pay the loan in full by its
due date, usually two weeks from the original loan date.41 If the consumer
failed to appear in person to pay off the entire loan by the due date and,
thereby, reclaim the check,42 the lender would normally present the check to
the consumer’s bank for loan repayment.43 Clearly, this early repayment
35. See, e.g., Ray Lewis, CG: Base Offers Alternatives to Payday Lenders, MARINES
(Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.marines.mil/unit/basecamppendleton/pages/news/2005/CG%20Base
%20offers%20alternatives%20to%20payday%20lenders.asp (quoting a representative for Money
Tree, a payday lender with a store located in San Diego, as stating that payday loans are a
“short-term solution”).
36. See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for a Small
Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 589, 589–90 (2001)
(describing the trap of payday lending as a “debt treadmill”).
37. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564–65 & n.1 (2010); see also Renuart &
Fox, supra note 36, at 589 (“The typical annual percentage rate is at least 390 and averages close
to 500 percent, although advocates and credit code enforcement agencies have noted rates of
1,300 percent to 7,300 percent.”). For example, a loan of $400 for a fee of $100 due in fourteen
days equates to an APR of 650%, or $2600. See Martin, supra, at 589 & n.1; see also Michael A.
Satz, How the Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Nature of the Payday Loan
Industry and Its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discriminatory Lending, 20 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 123, 129 (2010) (characterizing the fee as a finance charge that should be
viewed in terms of an APR rather than a flat fee).
38. See infra Part I.A–B.
39. See infra Part I.A–B.
40. Johnson, supra note 34, at 9–10.
41. Satz, supra note 37, at 129.
42. Johnson, supra note 34, at 10.
43. Barbara A. Monheit, The Regulators Speak, in 1 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 2003, at 459, 505 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1361,
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method could result in non-payment if other checks cleared before the lender’s
presentment and reduced the balance to zero.44
Payday lenders quickly realized the ineffectiveness of the old-fashioned
check-presentment process and developed more efficient payment processes,
most specifically electronic access to the borrowers’ accounts.45 As one state
regulator uncovered, some payday lenders’ initially gained electronic access by
obtaining borrowers’ personal identification numbers (PINs) during the loan
application process and then later used the PINs, without the borrowers’
knowledge, to withdraw funds.46
Instead of deceptively obtaining PIN numbers, the majority of payday
lenders now have consumers sign contracts that allow electronic debits to their
bank accounts to facilitate payment of the entire loan or only the rollover fee.47
Ordinarily, a consumer could revoke a debit authorization to avoid a
negative balance and future overdraft fees; however, a recent trend in debit
access is based on opaque contractual language intended to overrule the
borrower’s attempted revocation.48 Payday lenders use the borrower’s
bank-routing information to create a demand draft, which is an electronically
created, unsigned check by which the lender withdraws money from the
borrower’s bank account without the borrower’s knowledge or explicit
approval.49 As a result, the lender can unilaterally withdraw funds from the
borrower’s bank account despite the borrower’s previous request that the bank
stop all electronic debits.50
2003) (“When the loan is due, the lender expects to collect the loan by depositing the check or
debiting the borrower’s account or by having the borrower redeem the check with a cash
payment.”).
44. Id.
45. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 10.
46. The Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Servs. of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. app. at 59 (2009) [hereinafter Payday Loan
Reform Act Hearing] (testimony of Jean Ann Fox, Director of Financial Services, Consumer
Federation of America) (stating that examiners for the Idaho Department of Finance discovered
that several lenders, including Check ‘n Go, used borrowers’ PINs to electronically access
borrowers’ bank accounts).
47. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 32 n.156 (discussing the author’s study of payday lenders
in Franklin County, Ohio, which discovered that the majority of payday lenders had contractual
language requiring the borrower to agree to an electronic debit); see also Payday Loan Reform
Act Hearing, supra note 46, at 58–60 (describing the electronic debit authorization process).
48. See Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s
New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 91–92 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing]
(statement of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (stating
that online payday lenders used borrowers’ personal information to withdraw funds from the
borrowers’ accounts per language in the original loan contract).
49. See id. (defining demand drafts as “unsigned checks created by a third party to withdraw
money from consumer bank accounts”).
50. Id. (documenting that lenders created “demand drafts when consumers exercised their
[Electronic Funds Transfer Act] right to revoke authorization to electronically withdraw money
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Even when borrowers ask their banks to close their accounts to stop a
payday lender’s debits, banks routinely honor the debits causing the bank
accounts to become active again and triggering additional overdraft fees by the
banks.51 Some consumer advocates now refer to this scenario as a zombie
bank account and have to assist the borrowers in making the banks stop debits
after the bank accounts have been closed.52
Consumer advocates argue that the foregoing methods of withdrawing funds
from borrowers’ accounts violate state consumer-protection laws and exploit
loopholes in federal laws.53
These electronic-withdrawal methods set off an avalanche of detrimental
consequences for consumers.54 For borrowers with insufficient funds, the
lender’s repeated attempted debits can expose borrowers to numerous overdraft
or insufficient-funds fees.55 For example, one payday lender charged its
borrower a $20 return-debit fee, and the borrower’s bank charged her $2500 in
overdraft fees as a result of her account balance being insufficient to cover the
loans and other checks drawn on the account.56 Consequently, although the
payday loan is marketed as a better alternative to overdraft programs, it can
result in the borrower incurring substantial overdraft fees.

from their bank accounts”); see, e.g., Dan Sorenson, Unregulated Online Lenders Can Mean
Stress, Frustration, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Mar. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com
/business/local/article_4c1c4cc5-75d8-587c-954c-48b94430bf59.html (illustrating how one
borrower’s bank refused to allow access to her account to stop a payday lender from taking out
large amounts of her money).
51. See, e.g., E-mail from H.C. Klein to Claudia Wilner, paydayloans@yahoogroups.com
(Nov. 22, 2011, 5:20 PM) (on file with author).
52. See, e.g., E-mail from Claudia Wilner to paydayloans@yahoogroups.com (Nov. 22,
2011, 2:58 PM) (on file with author).
53. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 38, 91 (statement
of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (testifying that
state regulators condemned demand drafts to the Federal Reserve Board because lenders used
them to defraud consumers).
54. See Renuart & Fox, supra note 36, at 590; see also Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that
an online payday lender debited a borrower’s account every week for $60 to $70 for two months
and that when the borrower was finally able to contact the lender’s representative, the lender
would not tell her how much she owed on the $300 loan, but encouraged her to keep making
rollover payments).
55. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 88–91 (statement
of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (describing
overdraft fees, usually around $25 per overdraft transaction).
56. See, e.g., Marc Lifsher, Internet, Regulators Target Loans from Tribes, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2009, at B1 (reporting that the borrower attempted to stop lenders beforehand from
debiting her account once she realized that her employer’s direct deposit of her income check
would be delayed); Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that an attempted electronic debit resulted in
a $35 fee for insufficient funds because the borrower’s account balance was too low, and that
although the borrower attempted to revoke her debit authorization, the borrower’s bank refused to
honor it immediately and thereby allowed the lender to continue debiting her account).
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As a result of consumers’ debit authorizations, payday lenders often make
numerous withdrawals of funds for renewals or rollovers.57 These debits result
in consumers’ repeated and immediate payment of high fees and deprive them
of much-needed funds for high-priority expenses, such as utility bills and
housing.58 Online payday lenders, which are now a widespread enforcement
problem for state regulators, use debit authorization and frequently create fixed
dates to renew the loan every pay day automatically and withdraw only the
rollover fee or finance charge from the consumer’s bank account.59
The story of Bonnie Bernhardt illustrates how lenders use electronic access
to collect fees, leave the principal unpaid, and perpetuate the debt trap. Ms.
Bernhardt, a single mother from Wisconsin, obtained a $300 loan with an APR
of 782.14% from Arrowhead Investments, an online, Delaware-based payday
lender.60 Because Ms. Bernhardt failed to repay the loan after two weeks,
Arrowhead automatically “refinanced” the loan at a cost of $90 and did so
eight more times in two-week intervals, resulting in a total of $810 in
refinancing fees.61 Such refinancing did not give her additional cash; rather, it
only served to generate profits for the lender by simply extending the due date
on the loan for another two weeks.62 By the time Ms. Bernhardt came up with

57. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50.
58. See, e.g., id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, ‘Payday Loans’ Often Snowball,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A1 (stating that a single mother of two children paid $180 in
monthly fees on two $200 loans); Barr, Dokko & Keys, supra note 3, at 21 (reviewing a study of
payday borrowers in Detroit showing that lenders were more likely to suffer eviction or
disconnection of utility services).
59. CFA: ‘High Risks’ in Online Payday Lenders’ Websites, AM. BANKER (Dec. 20, 2004),
http://www.americanbanker.com/cuj/2004_250/-237381-1.htm. State regulators have tried to
stop payday lenders from using electronic access to raid a consumer’s bank account. For
instance, the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services (ODCBS) recently issued a
cease-and-desist order against Global Payday Loan (GPL), an online Salt Lake City-based
company operating through Payday-Loan-Yes.com. Global Payday Loan, LLC, No. I-11-0024, at
4–6 (Or. Dep’t Consumer & Bus. Servs. July 1, 2011) (order to cease and desist and order
assessing civil penalties). According to the order, GPL debited consumers’ bank accounts for an
origination fee of at least $30 and then debited the accounts for finance charges ranging from $30
to $250 to renew the loan every two weeks. Id. at 3. Some borrowers resorted to closing their
bank accounts just to stop GPL from withdrawing these fees. Id. The ODCBS fined GPL
$90,000 for violating the state’s payday lending statute by being unlicensed and issuing loans
with effective APRs ranging from 353% to 2737% to Oregon borrowers. Id. at 3–6. Oregon state
law caps the APR for payday loans at 36% and origination fees at $10 per every $100 loaned and
places restrictions on renewing existing loans. Id. at 9.
60. Pat Schneider, Online Payday Loans Pose New Challenges for Consumers, Regulators,
CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.) (Feb. 22, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local
/article_ba5dbf62-d466-5c7d-86b7-0977603fc490.html.
61. Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 80–97, Bernhardt v. Arrowhead Invs., Inc., No.
07CU4773 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 2009).
62. Id. ¶¶ 84–95.
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enough money to pay the entire loan balance, she had paid a grand total of
$1360 for a $300 loan.63
B. The Payday-Loan Industry’s Revenues: Earnings from Repeat Borrowers
Besides anecdotal evidence, such as Ms. Bernhardt’s story, research shows
that payday loans result in a long-term cycle of indebtedness for the majority
of borrowers64 and that trapped, repeat borrowers are the source of most of the
industry’s revenues.65 A study by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL)
demonstrates that “churning”—when lenders circumvent state-law prohibitions
on rollovers or refinancing by closing out the current loan and almost
immediately issuing the borrower a new loan—generates 76% of the industry’s
profits, amounting to $20.6 billion in loans.66 Because payday lenders will not
accept partial payments, it is common for consumers who are unable to provide
lump-sum repayments to incur rollover or refinance fees, which results in an
indebted aggregate far in excess of the original loan amount.67 Another CRL
study found that 90% of payday-lending revenues comes from fees assessed on
trapped borrowers and that the typical borrower pays back more than double

63. Id. ¶¶ 96–97. Ms. Bernhardt and 400 other Wisconsin residents obtained a court
settlement for their class action lawsuit against Arrowhead, in which they split $100,000 in
restitution, and Arrowhead agreed to forgive $432,000 in outstanding loans. See Schneider, supra
note 60. The lender was also barred from doing business in Wisconsin for five years. Id.
64. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING THE
DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM 7 (2007),
http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs2/07_1213_crl_springing.pdf (“The high price of a
payday loan and the fact that it must be paid off in one lump sum two short weeks later, virtually
ensures cash-strapped borrowers will be unable to meet their basic expenses and pay off their loan
with a single paycheck.”); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. According to the Center for
Responsible Lending report, only 2% of payday lending transactions involve borrowers “who
take out one loan, pay it off on time, and do not need to borrow again that year.” KING &
PARRISH, supra, at 7.
65. See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 21, at 6 tbl.1 (listing study results from select states
indicating that, on average, 90% of payday lenders’ revenue comes from borrowers who obtain at
least five payday loans per year).
66. See LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS,
ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 7, 13 tbl.7, app. II at 27 (2009), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf
(explaining the various ways churning occurs and stating that churning costs borrowers $3.5
billion in fees annually).
67. See, e.g., FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 2, at 9 (finding that more than 50% of
borrowers in North Carolina paid interest and fees that exceeded the initial loan amount);
Sorenson, supra note 50 (stating that an online payday lender withdrew $60 to $70 from a
borrower’s account every week for two months and then insisted that she still owed a balance on
the $300 loan without specifying how much); supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text
(discussing the refinancing fee that Ms. Bernhardt incurred, which amounted to $810 on a $300
loan).
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the amount of the original loan.68 Debunking the industry’s claim that payday
loans are a short-term solution, research consistently shows that most
borrowers obtain multiple rollovers or loans per year.69 Even during the
recession years of 2007 to 2010, the nation’s largest payday lenders earned
record profits from cash-strapped consumers.70
As the CEO of one of the largest payday lenders explained, the design of the
payday-loan debt trap is a deliberate business decision: “[T]he theory in the
business is you’ve got to get that customer in, work to turn him into a
repetitive customer, long-term customer, because that’s really where the
profitability is.”71 Consequently, borrowers get stuck running on a debt

68. See KING ET AL., supra note 21, at 6–8 & tbl.3 (“The typical payday borrower pays back
$793 for a $325 loan.”).
69. See, e.g., id. at 7 (finding that the average annual number of loans per borrower shows
that most borrowers are trapped in repeat borrowing); OHIO COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
TRAPPED BY DESIGN: PAYDAY LENDING BY THE NUMBERS 5 (2007), available at
http://www.cohhio.org/pdf/919TrappedByDesignfinal.pdf (finding that the average annual
number of loans is 12.6 percent and concluding that this results from borrowers’ inability to repay
the full loan and fees in such a short time period and cover living expenses); PARRISH & KING,
supra note 66, at 15 (finding that rollover borrowing is the rule, not the exception); LINDA A.
WATTERS, MICH. DEP’T OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, REPORT ON THE BUSINESS OF PROVIDING
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICE TRANSACTIONS IN MICHIGAN 15 (2007), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis/OFIS_DPST_REPORT_204749_7.pdf (finding that
only 1.1% of payday loans were issued to one-time borrowers between June 2006 and June 2007,
and that the average number of loans per borrower was 8.3). Professor Michael Barr found the
following:
Evidence from multiple states points to the fact that significant proportions of payday
loan consumers roll their loans over on a frequent, if not habitual, basis. A study of
payday borrowers in Illinois found that the median borrower had more than ten loan
contracts over a two-year period, and that one-fifth of borrowers had twenty or more
contracts in that time. In Wisconsin, 56% of payday borrowers took out at least eleven
loans in one twelve-month period. In Indiana, 77% of all payday transactions were
rollovers, and the average annual number of loan renewals was ten. In North Carolina,
the typical payday loan customer took out seven loans in one year from one lender.
The CFSA study found that three-quarters of payday borrowers rolled over their loan at
least once, and that 30% had seven or more rollovers. Using the Wisconsin statistic as
an example, the typical payday loan consumer, who takes out eleven two-week payday
loans per year, for the average loan amount of $300, at the average 470% APR from the
Consumer Federation of America (CFA) survey, spends nearly $600 annually in fees.
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 156–57 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
70. See BIANCHI, supra note 24, at 10 (“Annual filings show that the nation’s major payday
lenders collectively earn more from their high-cost cash advances than before the financial crisis.
From 2007 to 2010 their combined revenues from payday lending have increased 2.6%, or some
$30 Million in annual revenues.”).
71. KING & PARRISH, supra note 64, at 1 (quoting a telling comment made at a 2007
industry conference by Dan Feehan, CEO of Cash America); see also KING ET AL., supra note 21,
at 9 (pointing to industry practices that suggest competition to secure trapped customers, rather
than a higher number of occasional borrowers). Cash America is one of the six largest payday
lenders in America. BIANCHI, supra note 24, at 10.
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treadmill72 and postpone necessary purchases, lose important utility services,
and often must file bankruptcy to escape.73 In fact, one study of debtors in
Texas found that payday-loan borrowers are approximately 88% more likely to
file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in comparison to the general population.74
Organizations that advocate for and assist consumers see firsthand the
negative impact payday loans actually have.75 In a survey of non-profit
organizations in Texas, respondents identified payday lenders as the greatest
threat to consumer credit.76 In 2010, a survey of clients of Catholic Charities
in Texas revealed that most could not repay a payday or car-title loan by its
initial due date and most had trouble paying other bills after getting the loan.77
Similarly, in a survey conducted by the Bell Policy Center of Denver in 2007,
every credit counselor who participated in the survey and had payday-loan
borrowers as clients responded that payday loans had harmed their clients
72. Renuart & Fox, supra note 36, at 590 (discussing the “debt treadmill”); see also
Johnson, supra note 34, at 55–65 (discussing the debt treadmill propagated by industry practices).
73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the negative impact on many
borrowers who obtain payday loans).
74. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 21
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/olin/conf08/skiba.pdf; see also Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong,
Double Down-and-Out: The Connection Between Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 SW. U. L.
REV. 785, 803 (2010) (“[T]he data show that bankruptcy filers in New Mexico used a tremendous
number of payday loans, and unquestionably far more than in the general population.”).
75. See, e.g., Testimony of Kelly Rand, Catholic Charities of Fort Worth—Close the CSO
Loophole—Support HB 410, TEX. CATH. CONF. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.txcatholic.org/
index.php/component/content/article/72-testimony-and-letters-82nd-legislative-session/1069testimony-of-kelly-rand-catholic-charities-forth-worth-close-the-cso-loophole-support-hb-410
[hereinafter Testimony of Kelly Rand] (reporting that 20% of Texas Catholic Charities’ clients
sought cash assistance through payday and car title loans and discussing these clients’ “financial
stress”).
76. See TEX. APPLESEED, RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING
IN TEXAS: AFFORDABLE ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST PAYDAY AND AUTO TITLE LOANS 14
(2012), available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc
_download&gid=664&Itemid=.
77. See TEX. CATH. CONF. ET AL., 2010 CATHOLIC CHARITIES SURVEY ON PAYDAY AND
AUTO TITLE LOAN USE 1 (2010), available at http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/Legal/ANPR/
Credit_Access_Business/2010%20Catholic%20Charities%20CABs%20Survey%20Exec%20Sum
m.pdf (reporting several findings including that “83% of payday or auto title loan users [that
sought help from Catholic Charities] had trouble paying back the full loan when it came due,”
“70% had to extend or get new loans because they could not pay the full loan amount,” and “77%
of loan users believed that the loans made it hard to cover other bills”). Because of the financial
harm payday loans inflict, many religious organizations around the country are opposed to
payday lending. See, e.g., Emily Wagster Pettus, Associated Press, Miss. Religious Group Seeks
End to Payday Loan Law, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2011, 2:58 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9KUTJVG0.htm; Payday Lender Curbs
Backed, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.) (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.courier-journal.com/
article/20111115/NEWS01/311150045/Payday-lender-curbs-backed
(identifying
numerous
religious organizations in support of Kentucky passing legislation to curb payday lending);
Testimony of Kelly Rand, supra note 75.

2012]

Payday Loan Practices and the CFPB

395

financially and “73% . . . said they would ‘never’ recommend a payday loan to
a client.”78 Notably, 75% of credit counselors indicated that payday loans
were “very harmful” to their clients’ ability to both make mortgage and rent
payments and to pay other expenses.79 These and other studies80 confirm the
financial hardship imposed on payday borrowers.81 Along with consumer
advocates and non-profit organizations, the majority of federal lawmakers82
and many state lawmakers now recognize that payday loans are not a
beneficial form of short-term credit because of the long-term financial
problems generated.83
II. NON-BANKS AND BANKS CONTINUE TO EXPAND THEIR PAYDAY-LOAN
OPERATIONS
Several states have been very actively trying to protect their residents by
curbing payday lending.84 As explained below, payday lenders are essentially
ignoring or circumventing state lawmakers’ recent attempts to curb payday
lending.85 Moreover, some mainstream financial institutions are unwilling to
allow only non-bank payday lenders to reap the significant profits of high-cost
lending and now offer consumers their own versions of payday loans.86 These
banks are free to ignore state laws restricting the predatory characteristics of
payday loans because federal banking laws preempt such laws.87 Furthermore,
the prudential regulator of the national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of
78. Press Release, Bell Policy Ctr., Credit Counselors Unanimous: Payday Loans Harm
Coloradans (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://bellpolicy.org/sites/default/files/PaydayCredit
CounselorPR.pdf.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing other studies).
81. See, e.g., Testimony of Kelly Rand, supra note 75 (reporting that in Fort Worth, Catholic
Charities “provided $800,000 of financial assistance in 2010 to clients struggling with payday or
auto title loans”).
82. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Congress’s passage of a
federal law imposing numerous restrictions on payday loans to active-duty military families); see
also Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from
Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing how even
Republican lawmakers called payday lenders “loan sharks” on the debate floor when urging
members of Congress to vote in favor of a federal law protecting military families from payday
lending).
83. Cf. Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean
Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 214–15 (2007) (citing Mark Flannery
& Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 6 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin.
Research, Working Paper No. 2005/09, 2005)).
84. See Glen Fest, A Case for Payday Loans: There Actually May Be One, But Making It
Won’t Win You Any Friends, U.S. BANKER, July 1, 2011, at 9, available at 2011 WLNR
13079103 (reporting that ten states and the District of Columbia have banned payday lenders).
85. See infra Part II.A (discussing the schemes payday lenders devised to circumvent state
laws).
86. See Ulam, supra note 25.
87. See, e.g., id.
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the Currency (OCC), only offers guidelines for bank-issued loans that give the
banks broad latitude to issue high-cost loans.88 Consequently, as explained in
Part III of this Article, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which
has rulemaking authority over banks and non-banks, needs to exercise its
authority to protect consumers from payday lending.
A. Payday Lenders Find New Ploys to Avoid States’ Attempts to Regulate
Them
Although many academics and consumer advocates have uncovered
numerous recent schemes employed by non-bank payday lenders to avoid
state-law caps on APRs, several schemes are noteworthy. In particular, payday
lenders (1) make superficial changes to their loan products; (2) disguise their
operations as different types of financial institutions; (3) create partnerships
with Native American tribes; or (4) obtain different licenses to operate or drop
their licenses altogether.
1. Lenders Tweak Products to Avoid Regulation
Some payday lenders tweak their loan products to avoid falling within a
state’s definition of payday loan so that they can skirt payday-loan regulations
altogether and continue to charge exorbitant interest rates.89 For example, after
Illinois passed the Payday Loan Reform Act (PLRA) in 2005, defining a
payday loan as “a loan with a finance charge exceeding an annual percentage
rate of 36% and with a term that does not exceed 120 days,”90 payday lenders
increased the loan period by one day, called these products “installment loans,”
and continued charging APRs in excess of 700%.91 This change in the
maturity period did not go unnoticed by state legislators, who recently
amended the PLRA to broaden the definition of payday loans covered by the
statute.92 Payday lenders employed the same tactic in New Mexico and also
substantially increased the cost of the loan.93 Not only are payday lenders
using this tactic to avoid usury limits, but one survey of payday borrowing in
New Mexico demonstrates that such tactics are also used to bypass the
statutory limit on the number of outstanding loans a borrower can have and to

88. See infra Part II.A.2.
89. See Martin, supra note 37, at 585–91.
90. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/1-10 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
91. See Martin, supra note 37, at 590 & n.145; see also S. 96-120, Reg. Sess., at 99–100
(Ill. 2000).
92. Ill. S. 96-120, at 99–100 (quoting an Illinois state senator, Kimberly Lightford, as
stating that “many lenders evaded that payday regulation by making consumer installment loans
at a hundred and twenty-one days”).
93. See Martin, supra note 37, at 585–88 (providing, as an example, that a consumer who
obtains a $500 loan would be required to repay the $500 and an additional $585 in interest and
fees over the period of the loan, totalling $1085).
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skirt database reporting requirements to prevent state regulators from
accurately tracking payday lending.94
Some payday lenders changed their loan products to be open-ended loan
transactions to avoid interest-rate caps.95 Until recently, payday loans were
closed-end transactions; that is, a single loan transaction payable by the due
date.96 After the Virginia legislature passed a law restricting payday lending,
many lenders began offering open-end payday loans and claimed that the loans
were lines of credit, similar to a credit card, against which the consumer could
borrow in the future once the initial loan was paid in full.97 By claiming to
offer lines of credit, these payday lenders claim such credit products are
outside the scope of payday-loan regulations, thus allowing lenders to charge
fees exceeding state usury caps.98 For example, a $100 payday loan made in
compliance with Minnesota’s payday-loan statute would restrict the APR to
391%. However, by making the loan open-ended, the payday lender charges
an APR of 815% if it does not impose an annual fee and an APR of 2118% if it
imposes an annual fee.99 Even when the loan is structured as open-ended
credit, payday borrowers get trapped in a long-term debt cycle, potentially
lasting a year or more, via multiple back-to-back loans.100 Consequently, the
“open-ended” line of credit is merely a payday loan.101

94. See id. at 586–89.
95. See id. at 590 (citing SCC Plugs Payday Lending Loophole, RESPONSIBLELENDING.ORG
(Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/tools-resources/headlines/SCC-PlugsPayday-Loan-Loophole.html).
96. See Tom Shean, Credit Rules Won’t Protect Borrowers, Critics Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Apr. 13, 2007, at D2 (warning that payday lenders would avoid narrow regulations by
“switch[ing] from their closed-end loans, which have defined amounts and terms, and use
open-ended loans, the sort provided by credit card lenders”); see also RON ELWOOD & KARI
RUDD, LEGAL SERVS. ADVOCACY PROJECT, HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: A NEW GENERATION OF
PAYDAY LENDERS EXPLOIT A LEGAL LOOPHOLE TO PICK MINNESOTANS’ POCKETS 17 (2010),
available at http://www.mylegalaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/legal-loophole-report.pdf
(defining a closed-end loan as a “one time transaction, with the balance payable on the due date”).
97. See Martin, supra note 37, at 590 & n.144.
98. See Kimball Payne, Payday Lenders’ Loophole Narrowed, DAILY PRESS (Newport
News, Va.), Dec. 14, 2009, http://articles.dailypress.com/2009-12-14/news/0912130080
_1_payday-lenders-open-end-credit-allied-title-lending.
99. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 13.
100. See, e.g., Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., 708 S.E.2d 871, 872–85 (Va. 2011) (holding that a
payday lender’s practice of making back-to-back loans violated Virginia’s prohibition of
refinancings and renewals despite the lender’s claim that it issued the borrower thirty-three “new”
loans).
101. The author’s conclusion that these restructured loans are disguised closed-end credit is
contrary to one court’s interpretation. See Janos v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. CV051504PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 359758, at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the bank’s direct
deposit advance program is an “open-end” plan).
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2. Payday Lenders Disguise Their Operations
Rather than tweaking their loan products, some payday lenders are
masquerading as different types of organizations or financial institutions.102
For instance, payday lenders in Minnesota are perpetrating this deception to
evade a 1995 payday-lending law limiting fees and interest rates and
preventing rollovers.103 This law explicitly prohibited lenders from operating
as industrial loan and thrifts,104 which were originally created during the Great
Depression to provide consumers with funds to obtain affordable housing.105
Unfortunately for Minnesota consumers, a subsequent amendment to the 1995
law removed the prohibition and consequently created a loophole for payday
lenders to exploit.106
Since lenders learned of the loophole, the number of loans made by lenders
claiming to be an industrial loan and thrift increased dramatically from only 21
loans in 2003 to a whopping 161,031 loans in 2008.107 In contrast, the number
of regulated payday loans dropped from a record high of 233,926 in 2004 to
only 69,912 in 2008.108 Of the three licensed Minnesota payday lenders
actively masquerading as an industrial loan and thrift in 2010, none offered the
consumer financial services usually available from legitimately licensed
industrial loan and thrifts, which notably do not issue payday loans.109 As a
result of the rapid increase in the number of payday lenders masked as
industrial loan and thrifts, researchers estimate that payday lenders have
swindled Minnesotans of nearly $6 million in illegal fees, “[there]by
subverting the basic purpose of the Industrial Loan and Thrift model, designed
to provide home ownership opportunities and . . . to help stanch
foreclosures.”110 In the early 1980s, one lending institution’s vice president
commented that the thrifts were intended to serve consumers “who cannot
borrow funds on a balance-sheet basis from commercial banks but who are
deserving of credit at a much lower cost than 36 percent per annum.”111

102. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1152–53
(2008) (stating that payday lenders operate in Texas as “credit service organizations” and charge
hefty “brokerage” fees for brokering loans from the payday lenders).
103. MINN. STAT. § 47.60 (2009); ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 13 (citing Act of Mar.
24, 1995, ch. 202, art. 2, § 1, 1995 Minn. Laws, 917, 946–49 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47.59, 47.60 (West Supp. 2011))).
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59.
105. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844 (1996).
106. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 15; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59.
107. See ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 16.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 19 (quoting State ex rel. Duluth Clearing House Ass’n v. Dep’t of Commerce, 73
N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. 1955)).
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However, the APRs for payday loans are exponentially more than 36%.112 As
will be discussed, the CFPB must play an active role in clearly defining a
payday-lending business and must enforce penalties against those “disguised”
lenders in noncompliance with applicable laws.113
3. Payday Lenders Create Rent-A-Tribe Partnerships
In addition to masquerading as some other type of financial institution, some
payday lenders are entering into partnerships with Native American tribes to
avoid state law.114
These partnerships, commonly referred to as
rent-a-tribes,115 are a reincarnation of the now-illegal partnerships with banks,
known as rent-a-banks.116 In these partnerships, online payday lenders register
businesses on Native American lands117 and claim to be exempt from lawsuits
and state usury caps under tribal sovereign immunity.118 Using this doctrine,
lenders argue that because their businesses are located on or headquartered
within the borders of a Native American reservation, they are bound by the
laws of that reservation only, not the laws of the state in which the reservation
is located or the state in which the borrower resides.119
Although several states, including California, Colorado, Maryland, New
Mexico, and West Virginia, have initiated proceedings against online payday
lenders claiming tribal sovereign immunity,120 enforcement actions against
these entities have been somewhat unsuccessful.121 One court, however,
112. See id. at 19 n.57; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
113. See infra Part III.A–B (explaining the CFPB’s authority to define payday lending and
pass regulations expanding the scope of persons covered by the Dodd-Frank Act).
114. Michael Hudson & David Heath, Fights Over Tribal Payday Lenders Show Challenges
of Financial Reform, IWATCH (Feb. 7, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org
/2011/02/07/2151/fights-over-tribal-payday-lenders-show-challenges-financial-reform.
115. Id.
116. See id. For several years, payday lenders partnered with nationally charted banks to use
the doctrine of federal preemption—available to national banks under the National Bank Act—to
avoid compliance with state laws capping interest rates on payday loans. See FOX &
MIERZWINSKI, supra note 2, at 15–23. Federal banking regulators eventually put an end to
rent-a-banks, but only after years of numerous enforcement actions by state regulators, private
lawsuits by consumer attorneys, and campaign efforts directed at the bank regulators by consumer
advocacy groups. See id. at 22–24; Hudson & Heath, supra note 114.
117. See, e.g., Hudson & Heath, supra note 114; Ben Mook, South Dakota Payday Lender
Fights Cease-and-Desist Order by Md. Financial Regulators, DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.), May 15,
2011, http://thedailyrecord.com/2011/05/15/s-d-payday-lender-fights-cease-and-desist-order-bymd-financial-regulators, available at LEXIS, News & Business.
118. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114.
119. See, e.g., Mook, supra note 117.
120. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114.
121. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders Join with Tribes, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2011, at C2 (reporting that since 2005, Colorado Attorney General John Suthers has tried
(without success) to stop rent-a-tribe lenders from affecting his state’s residents); see also Cash
Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010) (remanding to the
trial court to determine whether tribal immunity applies to two payday lenders by considering the
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provided some guidance regarding whether tribal sovereign immunity protects
such partnerships. In Ameriloan v. Superior Court, the California Department
of Corporations sought to enforce state law against five online payday-loan
companies claiming to be wholly owned by the Miami Tribe in Oklahoma.122
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding that tribal
sovereign immunity did not apply to off-reservation activity, such as online
payday loans issued to California residents.123 However, the court remanded
the case for a factual determination of whether the companies were acting on
behalf of the Miami Tribe, as tribal sovereign immunity would only insulate
the lenders if the companies operate as actual “arm[s] of the tribe.”124
State regulators argue that these payday lenders are not arms of the tribes,
and that such arrangements are mere shams, intended to allow lenders to
circumvent state law.125 For example, authorities in Colorado assert that only
after the state initiated enforcement proceedings did the tribes incorporate the
payday lending companies as tribal business enterprises and establish lending
ordinances for their operations.126 Similarly, several states are pursuing
enforcement actions against Martin A. Webb, a member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe and the owner of several online payday-loan companies.127 The
websites for two of his companies, Western Sky Financial and Lakota Cash,
feature Native American logos but clearly state that each company “is owned
wholly by an individual Tribal Member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
and is not owned or operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of its
political subdivisions.”128 As one knowledgeable academic has rightfully
pointed out, because an individual tribe member owns the payday-loan

following: “(1) whether the tribes created the entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes
own and operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects the tribes’
sovereignty”).
122. 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 575–76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
123. Id. at 575.
124. Id. at 585–86 (quoting Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir.
2006)).
125. See, e.g., id. at 585. The California Department of Corporations urged the court to
consider evidence “show[ing] the payday loan companies’ alleged tribal associations are ‘a
sham,’ part of a ‘rent-a-tribe’ scheme designed to immunize their flagrant violations of”
California law. Id.
126. See Hudson & Heath, supra note 114.
127. See, e.g., Mook, supra note 117 (reporting that Maryland issued a cease-and-desist order
against Martin Webb’s lending company for charging outrageous APRs and that Colorado’s
attorney general filed a lawsuit against it as well); see also Press Release, Office of W. Va.
Attorney Gen., Attorney General McGraw Sues Eight More Payday Lenders, Demands
Companies Stop Doing Business in W.V. (Aug. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=533&fx=more (announcing charges against Martin Webb
and his lending company in West Virginia for soliciting payday loans with illegal APRs).
128. See LAKOTA CASH, http://www.lakotacash.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); WESTERN
SKY FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
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companies, rather than the tribe itself, these companies cannot be “arms of the
tribes” and are not entitled to immunity.129
4. Payday Lenders Either Obtain Different Licenses to Operate or Drop
Them
Instead of modifying their business format or relationships, some payday
lenders rid themselves of state licenses to operate and become illegal
businesses to avoid regulation.130 Others obtain new licenses to operate under
other lending statutes to avoid being covered by recently revised state
payday-loan statutes.131 Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
have seen this happen.132 This problem has become so prevalent that one
Florida lawmaker proposed legislation to make an unlicensed payday lender’s
collection on an illegal payday loan a felony.133
Ohio, in particular, has produced many glaring examples of payday lenders
exploiting various state lending licenses. In 2008, then-Governor Ted
Strickland signed into law the Short-Term Loan Act134 to curb predatory
payday lending.135 Specifically, the Short-Term Loan Act capped the
maximum loan amount at $500,136 limited the APR on payday loans to 28%,137
and mandated a loan maturity date at a minimum of thirty-one days.138 Shortly
after its passage, the payday-loan industry loudly voiced its disapproval of the
129. See Mook, supra note 117 (quoting Sarah Deer, a tribal law professor at William
Mitchell College of Law, as stating that the “immunity argument might prove to be a tough one
for Webb to prove since the companies are registered with the South Dakota Secretary of State
and are not owned by the tribe” and that only the tribe can claim immunity, not an individual
simply living on the reservation).
130. Payne, supra note 98 (explaining the unlicensed-lender problem in Virginia).
131. See, e.g., Associated Press, Payday Loan Restrictions Could Backfire, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Dec. 24, 2010, http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/business/your-business/2010-1224/payday-loan-restrictions-could-backfire?v=1293308441 (stating that according to the South
Carolina Board of Financial Institutions, “99 of the 245 payday lenders that discontinued their
licenses in 2009 applied for a supervised license so they could make short-term, unsecured loans
that don’t have the same restrictions as payday loans”).
132. See, e.g., id.; Payne, supra note 98 (stating payday lenders dropped their licenses in
Virginia).
133. See S.B. 536, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.35–1321.48 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
135. Jim Siegel, Strickland Signs Payday-Lending Bill, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 8, 2008,
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2008/06/02/payday.html. For a full list of the
Act’s prohibitions, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41. The Act also requires mandatory
disclosures of fees and higher costs, as compared to other forms of lending, before issuing a loan
to a consumer. Id. § 1321.39.
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.39(A).
137. Id. § 1321.40(A).
138. Id. § 1321.39. Other prohibitions designed to address the debt trap include banning
lenders from issuing more than four loans per year to a borrower, issuing a loan to a borrower for
the purpose of retiring an outstanding payday loan between the borrower and lender (refinancing),
and charging a fee to extend the loan’s maturity date (roll-over). See id. § 1321.41(G), (K), (R).
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new law by mounting a $20 million campaign to defeat the law through a voter
initiative placed on the November 2008 ballot.139 In response, Ohio voters
overwhelmingly defeated the industry’s initiative by a twenty-seven point
margin.140
After the defeat, payday lenders in Ohio started skirting the new law even
before its effective date.141 According to a March 2009 study conducted by the
Housing Research and Advocacy Center, only nineteen lenders had obtained a
license under the new law.142 Because the Short-Term Loan Act only applies
to businesses licensed under the Act and does not actually compel short-term
lenders to obtain licenses under it,143 most lenders avoided getting licenses
under the new law and obtained licenses under Ohio’s two more lenient
lending laws: Ohio’s Mortgage Loan Act and the Small Loan Act.144
Licensing under the Mortgage Loan Act is attractive because it does not
require issuance of an actual mortgage, does not define the length of the loan
term, and although it does cap APRs at 25%, the lender may charge various
fees, effectively resulting in triple-digit APRs.145 Similarly, the Small Loan
Act does not define the loan term and allows payday lenders to charge an
effective APR of 423%, which is higher than the 391% allowed under the
repealed payday-lending statute.146 Consequently, since the inception of the
139. Editorial, End Loan Abuses, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), May 2, 2010, at B6; James Nash &
Jim Siegel, 2 Ballot Issues Cost $82 Million: Battle over Issues Was Priciest in Ohio’s History,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2008, at A1, A4.
140. See Nash & Siegel, supra note 139, at A1, A4 (describing how the payday-loan industry
spent millions in comparison to the thousands spent by consumer advocates); Thomas Suddes,
Lender Loophole Isn’t Getting Fixed, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 23, 2009, at G1
(stating that “legislators’ delay in closing loopholes in Ohio’s anti-payday-loan law” was a “key”
example of the General Assembly’s failure to address pitfalls in legislation).
141. Payday lenders are similarly defying a new law in South Carolina. See Warren Bolton,
Editorial, Payday Lenders Are at It Again, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 3, 2010, at 6 (“Payday
lenders were happy to operate under the law adopted expressly for them as long as there were no
consumer protections . . . .”).
142. See JEFFREY DILLMAN ET AL., HOUS. RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CTR., THE NEW FACE
OF PAYDAY LENDING IN OHIO 1 (2009), available at http://www.thehousingcenter.org
/docman/Download-document/68-The-New-Face-of-Payday-Lending-in-Ohio-March-2009.html#
storylink=misearch.
143. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.35–.36 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010).
144. See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 1.
145. See id. at 8–9.
146. Id. at 7–8. Although the Small Loan Act provides for an interest-rate cap of 28% on
loans under $1000, payday lenders can charge higher interest rates because the Small Loan Act’s
definition of APR does not include any extra fees charged by the lender. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1321.10(A)(10), 1321.13(A) (LexisNexis 2010). Lenders under the Small Loan Act may
charge origination fees of $15 for loans under $500, and $30 for loans over $500. Id.
§ 1321.13(I)(1)–(2). The Act also allows lenders to charge $15 and $30 origination fees,
respectively, on each refinancing made six months after the original loan. Id. Additionally, a
licensee can contract for default charges for any payment not made within ten days after its due
date. Id. § 1321.13(K). Because the Act does not limit the length of the loan, lenders can charge
an APR of 423% on a fourteen-day, $100 loan. See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 7–8.
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Short-Term Loan Act, over 1000 payday lenders have obtained licenses under
the other two acts, as opposed to the new law.147
A September 2009 study by Policy Matters Ohio found that every payday
lender surveyed continued to charge triple-digit interest rates and required loan
repayment within two weeks or less, and most lenders issued loans in amounts
exceeding $500.148 Many lenders are Internet-based and charge interest rates
higher than, and issue loans in amounts greater than the brick-and-mortar
stores.149 Each of these practices would violate Ohio’s new law had these
lenders properly obtained licenses under the Act instead of circumventing the
Act by operating under laws intended to regulate different businesses.150 In an
unpublished opinion, an Ohio magistrate judge recently held that the Mortgage
Loan Act did not cover a payday lender’s loan product, labeled as a “Short
Term Financed Loan.”151 Because the lender was not licensed under the
Short-Term Loan Act, it was only entitled to interest at a rate of 8%, not the
triple-digit interest rate called for in the contract.152 The payday lender’s
employee admitted that its operations were basically the same as when licensed
as a “payday lender.”153 Because this decision does not have precedential
value, the payday lenders in Ohio continue to violate state law. Payday lenders
in other states are also allowing their payday-lending licenses to expire and are
instead getting licenses to operate under state laws not intended to cover their
loan products.154
The payday lending situation in Ohio and other states demonstrates that
payday lenders can and will skirt state legislative efforts to curb predatory
practices.155 If state regulators seek enforcement actions against them, payday
lenders keep regulators tied up in protracted litigation that unnecessarily

147. See DILLMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 3–5.
148. See DAVID ROTHSTEIN, POL’Y MATTERS OHIO, NEW LAW, SAME OLD LOANS: PAYDAY
LENDERS SIDESTEP OHIO LAW 1–4 (2009), available at http://www.policymattersohio.org
/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/NewLawSameOldLoans2009.pdf. Despite multiple visits and calls
to sixty-nine payday loan stores in Ohio, testers had trouble obtaining information about loan
terms. Id. at 2.
149. Id. at 4–5.
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.39, 1321.41 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 148, at 2.
151. See Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, No. 09CVF01488, slip op. at 1 (Elyria Mun.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2011).
152. Id. at 13–14.
153. Id. at 1.
154. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 131 (noting the high percentage of South
Carolina payday lenders that let their licenses expire in order to obtain different licenses to make
unsecured loans).
155. The exploitation of these loopholes has led to a proposed federal bill. See Protecting
Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of 2009, S. 500, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
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diverts limited governmental resources.156 The CFPB is, therefore, an essential
part of stopping the payday-loan industry’s flagrant violations of state laws.
B. Mainstream Financial Institutions Offer So-Called Direct-Deposit
Advances
Unlike non-bank payday lenders, traditional banks have no rules regulating
their high-interest, short-term loans to civilian consumers;157 consequently,
several banks now offer payday loans cleverly labeled “direct deposit
advances.”158 As a condition for receiving the direct-deposit advance, a
consumer must have a bank account with the lender-bank and must have his or
her income check automatically deposited into that account each pay period.159
These bank-issued loans are currently available in at least half of the states.160
Because banks are seeking to replace revenues lost from legal restrictions on
overdraft programs, analysts predict banks will promote their payday loans
more aggresively.161 In the absence of legal restrictions on the terms of these
bank-issued loans, they cannot be considered a safe, affordable alternative to
non-bank payday loans.162
1. Payday Loans Disguised as Direct-Deposit Advances
Bank-issued payday loans have triple-digit interest rates, short maturity
dates, and single balloon payments.163 Major banks, including Fifth Third
156. See, e.g., Jessica Legge Borders, Fight Against Internet Payday Lenders Continues,
TIMES W. VIRGINIAN, Nov. 22, 2009, http://timeswv.com/business/x546416422/Fight-againstInternet-payday-lenders-continues (“Since 2005, the Attorney General [of West Virginia] . . . has
been aggressively fighting against Internet payday lenders and trying to enforce the law.”);
Andrew DeMillo, Ark. AG Asks Payday Lenders to Shut Down or Face Lawsuits, S. BANCORP
(Mar. 19, 2008), https://banksouthern.com/news/ark-ag-asks-payday-lenders-to-shut-down-orface-lawsuits/ (reporting Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel’s decision to shut down
payday lending even though he expects payday lenders to fight in court for years).
157. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing a federal law imposing numerous
restrictions on payday loans to active-duty military families, and noting that such restrictions are
applicable to all financial institutions, not just non-banks).
158. See Chris Serres, Biggest Banks Stepping in to Payday Arena, STARTRIB., Sept. 6, 2009,
at D1, D7; Ulam, supra note 25.
159. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7; see also David Lazarus, 120% Rate for Wells’
Advances, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2004, at C1.
160. See Ulam, supra note 25.
161. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16
(stating that “[t]he new limitations on overdrafts, which will require affirmative consumer opt-in
for banks’ overdraft loan programs, will likely reduce banks’ overdraft fee revenues, perhaps by
27% to 34%,” and, consequently, “[b]anks are likely to push customers toward bank account
advance loans to replace this lost revenue”).
162. See Ulam, supra note 25.
163. See Letter from Adam Rust, Research Dir., Cmty. Reinvestment Ass’n of N.C., to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 (July 14, 2011), available at http://cranc.org/sites/cra-nc.org/files/pdf/occ%20guidance%20comment2.pdf (describing how the banks’
direct deposit advances have the same characteristics as payday loans and lead to a similar cycle

2012]

Payday Loan Practices and the CFPB

405

Bank, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo, offer short-term loans that carry fees
ranging from $7.50 to $10.00 for every $100.00 borrowed.164 The banks’
disclosures indicate that the maximum time a loan can remain unpaid is thirtyfive days; however, the loan amount and finance charge will be offset
automatically against incoming direct deposits of greater than $100.165
Because consumers typically are paid twice per month, this practice results in
the repayment of the loan in fourteen days, which translates into an APR of
261% or higher with a finance charge of $10 per $100.166 One study found
that the term for a typical bank-issued payday loan is only ten days, which
results in an APR of 365% for a $100 loan with a $10 finance charge, and that
the borrower enters a cycle of debt for an average of 175 days.167
Consequently, the bank’s direct-deposit loan product obligates the consumer to
pay a high-cost loan in a single balloon payment in a short amount of time.168
This process “forces most customers into a long-term cycle of borrowing that
systematically strips them of their funds.”169
Some banks claim to have policies preventing rollovers or renewals so as to
distinguish their loans from non-bank payday loans.170 Although this may be
technically true, consumers with account balances insufficient to cover both
the automatic loan payment and checks drawn on the accounts incur overdraft
fees, depriving them of money to cover other living expenses and forcing them
to obtain numerous back-to-back loans.171 As one study found, borrowers
of debt); see also Serres, supra note 158, at D7 (reporting how institutions issuing direct-deposit
advances debit borrowers’ accounts as soon as the paychecks for the following pay period have
been deposited).
164. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7; see also WELLS FARGO BANK, WELLS FARGO
DIRECT DEPOSIT ADVANCE SERVICE AGREEMENT AND PRODUCT GUIDE 3 (2011) [hereinafter
WELLS FARGO AGREEMENT], available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/checking
/dda/termsandconditions_english.pdf.
165. See WELLS FARGO AGREEMENT, supra note 164, at 4 (stating that although “each
advance must be repaid within 35 days, your advance may be repaid much sooner depending on
the timing of your next [incoming] Qualified Deposit,” which is defined broadly to cover deposit
sources such as paychecks and tax refunds (emphasis in original)).
166. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16 (stating that although banks technically disclose
an APR, it is grossly below the actual APR associated with the bank-issued loan); Serres, supra
note 158, at D7 (“[C]ustomers can’t extend on ‘roll over’ the loans because the amount owed is
automatically repaid with the next direct deposit.”).
167. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. Although the APR on bank-issued loans are
slightly lower than the APR on non-bank payday loans, the bank-issued loans carry late fees not
charged by non-bank payday lenders. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 300% BANK PAYDAY
LOANS SPREADING, supra note 26, at 1.
168. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
169. Id.
170. See Serres, supra note 158, at D7 (discussing a Wells Fargo spokesperson’s statements
claiming that the institution’s loan product differs from payday loans).
171. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; Randall & Zibel, supra note 27 (describing the
story of an Ohio resident, who incurred so many bounced-check fees as a result of her lender’s
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obtain, on average, sixteen bank-issued loans per year.172 Moreover, a Wells
Fargo employee admitted that “[m]any [borrowers] fall into a recurring cycle
of taking advances to pay off the previous advance taken.”173 Thus, if it
quacks like a payday loan, then it is a payday loan.
If the consumer’s direct deposit is too small to pay the loan in full, the
bank’s automatic deduction for payment will lead to overdraft fees, thereby
creating a need for an additional loan and worsening the consumer’s financial
crisis.174 This cyclical process is especially prevalent among social-security
recipients, who comprise a substantial percentage of the borrowers obtaining
Banks access a large percentage of
bank-issued payday loans.175
social-security recipients’ checks to pay off the loans.176 For example, a
social-security recipient who applied for a direct-deposit advance from Wells
Fargo ultimately obtained 24 loans in a 39-month period, paid $1200 in finance
charges with effective APRs ranging from 182% to 1825%, and paid $676 in
overdraft fees on loans marketed as a means of avoiding such fees.177 This
example illustrates that bank-issued loans are arguably worse than regular
payday loans because the bank’s automatic deduction process ensures priority
over any other creditors178 and violates consumer-protection laws enacted to
protect due-process rights and certain income sources from garnishment.179
automated debits—despite the lender’s so-called procedures to forestall long-term use of the
payday-loan and direct-deposit products—that she lost her bank account and is now unable to
open another).
172. BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
173. See Lazarus, supra note 159, at C8.
174. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 5 (“US Bank charges an overdraft fee
when a customer is delinquent on their outstanding checking account . . . [and] puts any future
payments towards the overdraft fee before satisfying the principal[,] . . . creating overdrafts.”).
175. BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 8 (“Nearly one-quarter of all bank payday borrowers
are Social Security recipients, who are 2.6 times as likely to have used a bank payday loan as
bank customers as a whole.” (footnote omitted)).
176. See id. (“[W]hen a Social Security recipient had an outstanding bank payday loan, the
bank took a sizeable proportion (33 percent) of the borrower’s next deposit to repay the loan and
fee.”).
177. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: PROPOSED GUIDANCE ON DEPOSIT-RELATED
CONSUMER CREDIT PRODUCTS 19 (2011) [hereinafter CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/
occ-comments-payday-overdraft.pdf.
178. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 25, at 3 (stating that regardless of the means by which U.S.
Bank obtains repayment of its bank-issued loan, the loan “is paid before all other transactions are
processed, including checks, preauthorized transfers and any other transactions”).
179. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 6; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 18–21 (asserting that banks violate the Social
Security Act when they use a borrower’s direct deposit of a social-security check to pay off the
payday loan, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act by requiring borrowers to authorize electronic
debits to repay loans, and lending regulations by issuing loans without assessing a borrower’s
ability to repay the loan).
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2. The OCC’s Guidance for Direct-Deposit Advances: A Possible Window
Dressing
With the limited exception of one federal law protecting military families
from payday lending, no federal law exists that imposes restrictions on banks
issuing payday loans to civilian consumers, and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), the prudential regulator of national banks, is currently
not inclined to regulate bank-issued payday loans.180
Before entering directly into the payday-loan market, some banks were
involved behind the scene for several years and provided billions of dollars to
finance the operations of non-bank payday lenders.181 This financing enabled
the payday-loan industry to borrow at a rate of 3.3% while charging consumers
an average APR of 455%.182 Some national banks entered into partnerships
with payday lenders, commonly known as rent-a-banks, so that the non-bank
payday lenders could use the doctrine of federal preemption available to
national banks to avoid compliance with state laws capping interest rates on
payday loans.183 After urging by consumer advocacy groups, the OCC put a
stop to rent-a-bank partnerships because of concerns that payday lending posed
risks to the safety and soundness of banks and risks to consumers.184 In 2000,
an OCC advisory letter regarding payday lending recognized that “payday
lending carries significant credit, transaction, reputation, and compliance and

180. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, sec. 670, § 987, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006));
Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 32
C.F.R. § 232.1 (2009). These laws and regulations apply to all financial institutions offering
loans that meet their definition of a payday loan. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(e) (defining a creditor as
“a person who is engaged in the business of extending consumer credit with respect to a
consumer credit transaction covered by this part”). However, because the Act defines a payday
loan as a closed-end credit product, 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1)(i), some banks circumvent this
definition by claiming that their direct-deposit advances are open-ended credit products. CRL
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 21. The OCC originally took the
position that payday lending was unacceptable among banks. See id. at 27 (urging the OCC not
to adopt guidelines proposed in 2011 that would legitimize triple-digit APRs on loans issued by
banks); Andrew Kahr, New Loan Type Will Force New Limits, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 2010, at 9
(reporting on an OCC statement from years ago, which asserts that “payday lending is not an
appropriate activity for a national bank”).
181. See KEVIN CONNOR & MATTHEW SKOMAROVSKY, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION & PUB.
ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE, THE PREDATORS’ CREDITORS: HOW THE BIGGEST BANKS ARE
BANKROLLING THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 18–19 (2010), available at
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2010/09/14/19/paydayreport_FINAL.source.prod_affiliate.
56.pdf.
182. Id. at 19.
183. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 8.
184. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL
2000-10, PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2000) [hereinafter OCC ADVISORY LETTER], available
at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2000/advisory-letter-200010.pdf.
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legal risks that raise supervisory concerns.”185 In 2003, then-Comptroller John
D. Hawke Jr. told payday lenders to “[s]tay the hell away from national banks”
when explaining the OCC’s enforcement action against Peoples National Bank
for its rent-a-bank partnership in South Carolina.186
In a remarkable flip-flop, the OCC, under different leadership, has ignored
its previous guidance addressing payday loans and proposed new guidelines
that would allow national banks to continue offering their own versions
The OCC’s 2011 proposed guidelines regarding
of payday loans.187
direct-deposit advances avoid the “payday loan” term and are vague on many
of the payday-loan characteristics that are considered predatory.188 For
example, although the OCC is aware that payday lending leads to multiple
rollovers or back-to-back loans, the OCC’s guidance states only that
“[d]eposit-related credit products should be subject to prudent limitations on
credit extensions, customer costs, and usage.”189 Incredibly, the OCC fails to
provide examples of “prudent limitations;”190 thus banks like Wells Fargo
would be free to interpret the rules to allow consumers to obtain multiple backto-back loans.191 Because the OCC’s guidelines are indefinite and leave
untouched many of the payday-loan characteristics that are considered
predatory, they may be a mere window dressing designed to legitimize
bank-issued payday loans.192 The OCC’s actions are particularly unfortunate
for consumers because bank-issued payday loans and regular payday loans are
185. Id.
186. See Ben Jackson, OCC Payday Purge Done; Lenders Eye State Banks, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 3, 2003, at 1 (identifying several banks that the OCC ordered to sever their partnerships with
payday lenders).
187. Compare OCC ADVISORY LETTER, supra note 184, at 1–8 (describing the risks
associated with bank payday lending), and CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE,
supra note 177, at 4–8 (critiquing the proposed OCC guidance and recommending heightened
restrictions), and Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1–10, with Guidance on DepositRelated Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,409, 33,410–13 (proposed June 8, 2011)
(detailing the OCC’s proposed guidance). See also Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection
After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Hous.,
& Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 21–22 (2011) (written testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, President,
Ctr. for Responsible Lending), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1980c90b-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a&
Witness_ID=3cb65047-012f-4110-991a-ec0463ae648d (stating that the “OCC recently proposed
weak guidance addressing the bank[-issued] payday loans”).
188. See Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. at
33,409–13; see also Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 2 (criticizing the guidelines as
being “too vague”).
189. See Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,410.
190. Id.; Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 6.
191. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
192. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 23 (criticizing
the “high degree of flexibility” included in the OCC’s guidance); see also BORNÉ ET AL., supra
note 16, at 12 (“[T]he OCC proposed guidance on payday lending that accepts many current bank
practices and essentially condones the most harmful aspects of the product . . . .”).
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practical equivalents.193 Additionally, the OCC requested written comments
on its proposed guidance less than forty-five days before the day the CFPB
became operational.194 Critics rightfully question the timing of the OCC’s
guidelines as an attempt to stealthily usurp rulemaking authority from the
CFPB.195
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
When President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law and established
the CFPB, he remarked that “our financial system only works—our market is
only free—when there are clear rules and basic safeguards that prevent abuse,
that check excess, that ensure that it is more profitable to play by the rules than
to game the system.”196
President Obama’s remarks are clearly applicable to payday loans. As
explained in Part II, regular non-bank payday lenders are constantly gaming
the system; that is, circumventing state laws intended to regulate their loan
products.197 In addition, mainstream banks are now players in the payday-loan
business and are subject to only vague guidelines the banks could choose to
ignore.198 Although credit unions have a reputation comparable to a trusted
uncle from whom one could obtain a loan,199 some credit unions have been
accused of offering high-cost loans similar to regular payday loans.200 A rule
recently adopted by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) sets a
28% APR cap on short-term loans offered by federal credit unions and imposes
other lending restrictions as well.201 Despite the NCUA’s rule, however,
circulating media reports document some credit unions charging excessive
193. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1; see also supra Part II.B.1.
194. See Letter from Adam Rust, supra note 163, at 1.
195. Id. at 1, 5. The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly transfers “[a]ll consumer financial protection
functions of the Comptroller of the Currency” to the CFPB. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1061(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2036 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5581
(Supp. IV 2010)); see also id. § 1061(a)(1)(A) (defining “consumer financial protection
functions” as “all authority to prescribe rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal
consumer financial law, including performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review
such rules, orders, and guidelines”).
196. William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at
A27.
197. See supra Part II.A–B.
198. See supra Part II.A–B.
199. See Frank J. Diekmann, The Agenda Item You Won’t Find on the Agenda, CREDIT
UNION J., June 27, 2011, at 6 (discussing which credit unions act morally and responsibly and
which have suffered a “moral lapse” as result of their so-called alternatives to payday loans); Ben
Hallman, More Credit Unions Offering Payday Loans, WASH. POST, May 31, 2011, at A8
(reporting that credit unions traditionally offer “prudent loans . . . without the profit motive of
traditional banks”).
200. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 199, at A8 (reporting that Mountain American Federal
Credit Union and other credit unions offered loans with triple-digit interest rates).
201. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii) (2011).
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application fees disguised as finance charges, which cause the loans to have
effective APRs in excess of 100%.202 Thus, the current financial landscape for
payday loans demonstrates that many market participants play by their own
rules and that “competition” among them has not resulted in the widespread
availability of reasonably priced loans to consumers.203 Consequently, the
CFPB needs to exercise its regulatory authority and intervene.
The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA)—Title X of the
Dodd-Frank Act—establishes several objectives for the CFPB,204 and this
section focuses on two: (1) to exercise its authority under federal
consumer-protection laws to ensure consumers are protected from unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices; and (2) to ensure such laws are
enforced consistently, without regard to the status of a depository institution, to
promote fair competition.205 This section asserts that the CFPB can declare
predatory characteristics of payday loans to be unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or
abusive, and thereby federally regulate payday lending to afford consumers
basic protections from payday loans, regardless of which type of financial
institution issues them.206
A. The Scope of the CFPB’s Authority over Financial Institutions
The CFPB’s purpose is to “seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce
Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring [1]
that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and
services and [2] that markets for consumer financial products and services are
fair, transparent, and competitive.”207 The CFPB’s jurisdiction under the Act
is over only a “covered person,” which includes both non-bank payday lenders
and traditional financial institutions like banks and credit unions so long as

202. See, e.g., Diekmann, supra note 199, at 6; Hallman, supra note 199, at A8.
203. See Hallman, supra note 199, at A8.
204. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1001, 1021(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 1980
(2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5511 (Supp. IV 2010)).
205. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(b)(2), (4).
206. See infra Part III.A–D.
207. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(a). Under Title X, the CFPB’s enumerated primary functions
are:
(1) conducting financial education programs; (2) collecting, investigating, and
responding to consumer complaints; (3) collecting, researching, monitoring, and
publishing information relevant to the functioning of markets for consumer financial
products and services to identify risks to consumers and the proper functioning of such
markets; (4) subject to sections 1024 through 1026, supervising covered persons for
compliance with Federal consumer financial law, and taking appropriate enforcement
action to address violations of Federal consumer financial law; (5) issuing rules, orders,
and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial law; and (6) performing such
support activities as may be necessary or useful to facilitate the other functions of the
Bureau.
Id. § 1021(c)(1)–(6).
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they “engage in offering or providing a consumer financial product or
service.”208
Although the CFPB has exclusive rulemaking authority with respect to all
financial institutions offering payday loans,209 its actual authority to enforce its
promulgated rules is dependent on the kind of financial institution. The CFPB
has examination and primary enforcement authority over large financial
institutions (LFIs)—banks, credit unions, and savings and loan
associations—with assets exceeding $10 billion.210 However, the CFPB has
the authority only to accompany prudential regulators on examinations of
financial institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets—smaller financial
institutions (SFIs).211 In other words, the prudential regulators of the SFIs still
have primary responsibility for examining the SFIs and exclusive authority to
enforce their compliance with consumer-protection laws and regulations.212
As for the typical non-bank payday lender, the CFPB has rulemaking,
examination, supervisory, and enforcement authority over any non-depository
covered person that “offers or provides to a consumer a payday loan.”213
Based on the foregoing, the CFPB has broad enforcement authority over
non-banks engaged in payday lending, as well as primary enforcement
authority over LFIs offering payday loans.214 Unfortunately, the CFPB has no
enforcement authority over SFIs like the credit unions that are allegedly now
offering high-priced loans;215 therefore, it is likely to encounter opposition in
affording consumers protection from payday lending. Nevertheless, because
the CFPB has rulemaking authority over all financial institutions216 and has the
ability to recommend best practices to the FDIC, NCUA, and other prudential

208. See id. § 1002(6)(A)–(B).
209. See id. § 1022(b)(4)(A).
210. See id. § 1025(a)–(b); id. § 1025(b)(1)(A)–(C) (granting the CFPB “exclusive authority
to require reports and conduct examinations on a periodic basis” of LFIs for several purposes,
including “detecting and assessing associated risks to consumers and to markets for consumer
financial products and services”); id. § 1025(c)(1) (“To the extent that the Bureau and another
Federal agency are authorized to enforce a Federal consumer financial law, the Bureau shall have
primary authority to enforce that Federal consumer financial law.”); see also id. § 1002(a)(24)
(identifying the FDIC as the prudential regulator for insured depository institutions and the
NCUA as the prudential regulator for insured credit unions).
211. See id. § 1026(a); id. § 1026(d)(1) (“Except for requiring reports under subsection (b),
the prudential regulator is authorized to enforce the requirements of Federal consumer financial
laws and, with respect to a covered person described in subsection (a), shall have exclusive
authority (relative to the Bureau) to enforce such laws.”).
212. See id. § 1026(d)(1).
213. See id. § 1024(a)(1)(E), (c)(1).
214. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 199, at A8.
216. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(h)(4)(A).
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regulators of the SFIs,217 the CFPB should encourage these regulators to force
SFIs to comply with the CFPB’s regulations.218
The CFPB is specifically authorized to issue “rules, orders, and guidance
implementing Federal consumer financial laws.”219 The CFPB’s rulemaking
authority is exclusive;220 however, it shares part of that authority with the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).221 The CFPA mandates that courts afford
deference to the CFPB with respect to “the meaning or interpretation of any
provision of a Federal consumer financial law” as though “the
[CFPB] . . . were the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret or
administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial law.”222
Although courts must defer to the CFPB’s interpretations, the CFPA
imposes some constraints on the CFPB’s rulemaking authority.223 First, the
CFPA obliges the CFPB to consult with the “appropriate prudential regulators
or other Federal agencies prior to proposing a rule” and release any of their
objections.224 Second, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can
veto, by a two-thirds majority vote, any CFPB regulation that “would put the
safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the
financial system of the United States at risk.”225 These constraints, however,
should not deter the CFPB from exercising its authority to regulate payday
lending by prohibiting the worst payday-loan practices.
B. The CFPB Has Rulemaking Authority to Define Payday Loans and Covered
Persons
The CFPB first and foremost must use its rulemaking authority to define a
“payday loan.”226 Although the definition appearing in an earlier draft of the
Dodd-Frank Act was ultimately eliminated,227 the Act unquestionably covers
217. Id. §§ 1002(a)(24), 1024.
218. See id. § 1026(d)(2)(A) (“When the Bureau has reason to believe that a person described
in subsection (a) has engaged in a material violation of a Federal consumer financial law, the
Bureau shall notify the prudential regulator in writing and recommend appropriate action to
respond.”).
219. Id. § 1021(c)(5).
220. See id. § 1022(b)(4)(A).
221. See id. § 1061(a)(5).
222. Id. § 1022(b)(4)(B).
223. Id. § 1022(b)(2).
224. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(B)–(C). The CFPB must release any written objections submitted in
opposition to the proposed regulation and its response to the objection. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C).
225. Id. § 1023(a).
226. The author argues in another forthcoming law review article that the CFPB should
establish guidelines for safe, affordable loans and eliminate using the words “payday loans” as
they have become synonymous with predatory credit transactions.
227. See Payday Loan Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 2871, 110th Cong. sec. 2, § 128(e)(2)(B)
(2007) (defining a “payday loan” as “a small cash advance . . . made” in exchange for “(A) the
personal check or share draft of the consumer, in the amount of the advance plus a fee, where
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the typical payday loan, as well as any purported “nonfinancial good or service
[that] is done as a subterfuge, so as to evade or circumvent the provisions of”
the Act.228 In crafting an explicit definition, the CFPB should look to other
definitions of payday loans to avoid making the definition too narrow. For
example, Illinois initially defined a payday loan as a loan with a 120-day loan
period; however, the definition was ineffective because payday lenders simply
expanded the loan maturity date by one day to skirt the usury cap.229
Similarly, Congress passed a law—commonly referred to as the Military
Lending Act—to protect active-duty soldiers and their families from payday
lending.230 The law defines a payday loan as a closed-end credit transaction
with a term of ninety-one days or less and an amount no greater than $2,000.231
As explained previously, many non-bank payday lenders and, in particular,
bank-issued direct-deposit advances have abandoned contractual language
identifying their loans as closed-end credit and now claim to offer open-ended
credit.232 Because these open-ended loans often result in multiple back-to-back
loans for the consumer, they function just like regular payday loans233 and,
therefore, should be included in the CFPB’s definition of a payday loan.
This Article does not aim to recommend a precise definition; rather, it
recommends that the CFPB should broaden the payday-loan definition to
include payday loans having the semblance of another loan product.234 In
broad terms, a payday-loan definition should acknowledge that the loan is an

presentment or negotiation of such check or share draft is deferred by agreement of the parties
until a designated future date; or (B) the authorization of the consumer to debit the transaction
account or share draft account of the consumer, in the amount of the advance plus a fee, where
such account will be debited on or after a designated future date”).
228. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(a)(B)(ii).
229. See Stephen Franklin, Interest Still High in Payday Battle, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2008,
§ 5 (Business), at 1 (reporting that payday lenders exploited the loophole by issuing loans for a
term of 121 days and calling them installment loans).
230. See John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
sec. 670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b)
(2006)).
231. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1)(i) (2011).
232. See CRL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED OCC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 21 (explaining
how banks call their loans open-ended credit to circumvent the Military Lending Act’s (MLA)
definition of payday loan for the purpose of issuing high-cost loans to military personnel); see
also BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 12 (asserting that by structuring their loans as open-ended
credit, banks “undermine[] federal law aimed at protecting military service members”); supra
notes 31, 95–97, 180 and accompanying text (explaining that the MLA imposes restrictions on
bank-issued payday loans to military families if the loans meet the MLA’s definition of payday
loan).
233. See, e.g., supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text (describing how a social-security
recipient’s initial direct-deposit advance (a bank-issued payday loan) caused him to obtain 24 of
these loans in a 39-month period).
234. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing how non-bank lenders tweak their loans to evade state
law restrictions on payday loans).
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unsecured,235 small-dollar loan of $3000 or less and should not distinguish
between closed-end and open-ended terms. If the definition must have a
maturity period, the CFPB should regulate all loans with a one-year term or
less, because many consumers may become trapped in long-term payday-loan
debt cycles for several months.236
The CFPB’s “payday loan” definition should also identify all known
subterfuges, regardless of lenders’ clever labeling. This will help counteract
the amply evidenced practice of lenders disguising payday loans as other
products and services.237 The CFPB should also draft language, such as
“including, but not limited to,” to appear at the beginning of the subterfuge list.
Such language enables courts to encompass within the CFPB’s regulation any
future subterfuge used by lenders to dodge state or federal regulations.
In addition to defining payday loans, the CFPB should exercise its authority
to expand the definition of a “covered person”238 to include companies
pretending to be some other type of entity, such as a financial thrift institution
or a tribal partnership.239 For example, an investigation into the Oklahoma
Tribe of Miami, which claimed to operate payday-lending businesses as
economic tribal subdivisions, revealed an empty warehouse at the businesses’
address.240 Such payday lenders with only a tangential connection to Native
American tribes should be identified as a “covered person.”241 If the CFPB
fails to expand the scope of covered persons, more payday lenders will form
nominal tribal partnerships and continue to offer loans in violation of state
laws.242

235. The loan would be considered unsecured even if the lender claims as collateral a
post-dated check, instrument, property worth little value, or property the lender would never
repossess.
236. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Short On Cash.Net of New Castle, Inc. v. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 811 N.E.2d 819,
826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (enjoining a purported Internet service provider’s operations and finding
its sale of bimonthly one-hour web access to be a disguised payday loan in violation of state usury
law); Johnson, supra note 34, at 18–20 (discussing payday loans disguised as a “sale-lease-back”
transaction or “catalog sale”); see also supra Part II.A–B.
238. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1987 (2010)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)) (“The Bureau shall consult with
the Federal Trade Commission prior to issuing a rule . . . to define covered persons subject to this
section.”).
239. See supra Part II.A.2–4.
240. Hudson & Heath, supra note 114.
241. See supra Part II.A.3.
242. Furthermore, because the CFPB has examination authority over non-banks, Dodd-Frank
Act § 1024(d), it should investigate companies claiming tribal immunity.
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C. The CFPB Can Declare Many Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Deceptive,
or Abusive
After expanding the definitions of payday loans and covered persons, the
CFPB should prescribe rules that make common payday-loan terms and
practices unlawful.243 The CFPB has explicit authority under the CFPA to
identify as unlawful any act or practice that is “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” in
connection with a consumer financial product or service.244 This statutory
authority is similar to the FTC’s authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts
or practices;245 however, the FTC’s statute does not mention authority to
proscribe “abusive” practices.246
This section discusses payday-loan practices that the CFPA should deem
unfair, deceptive, and abusive, respectively, and the bases for such
determinations.
1. Unfair Practices Inflict Substantial Injury
The CFPA should identify certain “unfair” payday-lending practices as
unlawful. The CFPA imports the standard for unfairness from the law
governing the FTC.247 When the CFPB has a reasonable basis, it may declare
an act or practice to be unfair if the act causes the consumer substantial and
reasonably unavoidable injury that is not outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to the consumer.248 The data clearly support the conclusion that high
interest rates, short maturity dates, single balloon payments, multiple rollover
or refinancing fees, and repetitive electronic bank-account access substantially
injure some consumers and that the economic injury caused by these practices
outweighs any benefits to consumers.249 Multiple studies show that triple-digit
interest rates, often in violation of state law, cost consumers millions of
dollars.250 Moreover, most consumers are unable to repay the loans in a short

243. See id. § 1022(b)(1).
244. Id. § 1031(b) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or
service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in
connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or
the offering of a consumer financial product or service. Rules under this section may include
requirements for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.”).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
246. Compare id., with Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a).
247. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), with Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c).
248. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1)(A)–(B). The CFPB may also consider public policy in
determining fairness. Id. § 1031(c)(2).
249. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.
250. See, e.g., ELWOOD & RUDD, supra note 96, at 3 (estimating that payday lenders
collected nearly $6 million in fees from Minnesotans, which was in violation of state law);
PARRISH & KING, supra note 66, at 13 (finding that “churning” accounts for $3.5 billion in fees);
Martin, supra note 37, at 885–91 (describing how lenders subvert state laws in order to charge
higher APRs).
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period, usually two weeks, as required under their contracts,251 and must resort
to paying multiple rollover fees or obtaining several successive loans.252
Recall the earlier, illustrative example of Bonnie Bernhardt, whose bank
account was debited nine times to obtain more than $800 in refinancing fees
for a mere $300 loan.253 The harm caused by these practices substantially
outweighs any potential benefit.
Furthermore, the lenders’ use of repeated debits or demand drafts to
withdraw funds from the borrowers’ bank accounts worsens the borrowers’
economic injury by depleting account funds needed to pay bills and by
triggering NSF or overdraft fees for consumers with insufficient account
balances.254 Consumer advocates maintain that federal regulators have largely
turned a blind eye to this practice,255 which is often carried out through
contract terms that would likely confuse the average consumer and are in
violation of state consumer-protection statutes.256 In states that ban rollovers,
some lenders induce consumers to obtain multiple consecutive loans, crafted as
a means of collecting additional fees on the original loan.257 Some lenders also
structure loans that automatically deduct from the borrower’s bank account
only a rollover or refinancing fee, unless the borrower takes additional steps to

251. See supra Part I.B. A report prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense found that
“75% of payday customers are unable to repay [the entire] loan within two weeks and are forced
to get a loan ‘rollover’ at additional cost.” See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY
LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
14 (2006) [hereinafter DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING], available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf.
252. See, e.g., DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 30 (finding that
since August 2001, slightly over $2.5 million has been provided to service members experiencing
financial crises due to payday-loan debt traps).
253. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 47–59 and accompanying text; see also PARRISH & KING, supra note
66, at 12–13 (stating that that multiple back-to-back loans cost borrowers $3.5 billion in fees
annually).
255. See, e.g., Community and Consumer Advocates’ Perspectives on the Obama
Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 111th Cong. 108 (2009) [hereinafter Consumer Advocates’ Perspective Hearing]
(testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (“The
Federal Reserve has supported the position of payday lenders and telemarketing fraud artists by
permitting remotely created checks (demand drafts) to subvert consumer rights under the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act.”).
256. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 92 (testimony of
Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America). One contract stated,
“While you may revoke the authorization to effect ACH debit entries at any time up to 3 business
days prior to the due date, you may not revoke the authorization to prepare and submit checks on
your behalf until such time as the loan is paid in full.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
257. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., 708
S.E.2d 871, 874 (Va. 2011) (finding that this practice is equivalent to a renewal or refinancing,
which are prohibited).
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pay off the loan in full.258 Consequently, many payday-loan borrowers end up
financially worse off after having obtained the payday loan and, therefore,
suffer substantial economic injury.259
The financial injury from payday loans is particularly acute in African
American and Latino communities. One California study found that “[p]ayday
lenders are nearly eight times as concentrated in neighborhoods with the
largest shares of African Americans and Latinos as compared to white
neighborhoods, draining nearly $247 million in fees per year from these
communities.”260 Similarly, when the loans are bank-issued payday loans, the
financial injury to senior citizens dependent on social-security benefits is acute
because the banks take a large portion of their check to repay the loans.261
Accordingly, because the above-mentioned payday-loan practices worsen the
consumer’s financial condition, the substantial injuries arising from them are
not outweighed by any potential benefits to the consumer.
Although the prongs of “substantial injury” and “not outweighed by
countervailing benefits” are evident, the debatable prong of the unfairness test
is whether the financial injury arising from major payday-loan practices is
reasonably unavoidable.262 An injury is not reasonably avoidable if consumers
lack any “free and informed choice” enabling them to avoid the unfair
258. DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 16; see supra notes 60–63
and accompanying text (discussing the example of Ms. Bernhardt’s experience with this practice).
259. 151 CONG. REC. E1386 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Luis Gutierrez)
(“[M]any who turn to these payday loan outlets end up far worse off than before.” (emphasis
added)); see supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text (discussing the financial hardships
resulting from payday lending).
260. WEI LI ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PREDATORY PROFILING: THE ROLE
OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 10 (2009),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analysis/predatoryprofiling.pdf (“When [the authors] compare[d] the neighborhoods with the highest and lowest
shares of African Americans and Latinos, [the authors found] that African American and Latino
neighborhoods have a 2.4 times greater concentration of payday lending storefronts.”); see also
Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 166 (2010) (describing the
prevalence of various predatory loan products in communities of color and identifying specific
ways in which corporate America uses individual minorities to target communities of color with
these loan products).
261. See BORNÉ ET AL., supra note 16, at 8 (finding that banks deducted an average of 33%
of a social-security recipient’s next deposit to repay the bank-issued loan). Gender disparity is
also at play in payday lending. A recent study of payday lending in Texas reported that women,
and in particular single women and single mothers, comprise the majority of Texas payday
borrowers. TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 13–14 (implying that Texas provides a snapshot
of the typical payday borrower because “Texas is the source of 60% of the annual profits reported
nationwide by the four largest publicly traded companies offering payday loans”).
262. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (declaring that
“unfair” practices are those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”).
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practice.263 The unavoidable-injury prong is not interpreted conservatively.264
The FTC and the courts have held that this prong of the unfairness test does not
mean that an injury is avoidable just because the consumer could have chosen
not to enter into the contract or that the consumer could have chosen to do
business with a competitor; rather, the consumer must have a basis to
anticipate the financial harm.265 Before entering into a payday-loan contract,
average consumers have no reason to anticipate that their payment of fees for
due-date extensions will not count towards reducing the principal on the loan
because all other forms of traditional consumer credit allow for partial
payments that reduce some portion of the principal.266 Moreover, average
consumers have no reason to anticipate that lenders will repeatedly debit their
bank accounts, thereby triggering multiple overdraft or NSF fees for those with
extremely low balances.267 Additionally, consumers with some money in their
account have no reason to anticipate that lenders will debit the accounts
repeatedly to collect only rollover fees, thereby depleting funds needed to pay
other bills and forcing consumers to figure out how to pay off the entire loan or
how to take extra steps to close their bank accounts so the debits will cease.
Finally, consumers, at the time of contracting, have no reason to anticipate that
banks may allow their accounts to become zombie accounts, allowing
withdrawals even after consumers have officially closed their accounts.268
Because consumers have no reason to anticipate harm from the foregoing
lending practices, the financial injury from these payday-lending practices are
therefore reasonably unavoidable.269
Even if the unavoidable-injury prong is interpreted conservatively, the CFPB
has several reasons to conclude that such free and informed choice is lacking
and, therefore, the injury arising from the six major payday-loan practices270 is
not reasonably avoidable. For one, the payday loan industry and borrowers
263. See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (citing FTC v. J.K.
Publ’ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (S.D. Cal. 2000)).
264. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
251–52 (7th ed. 2008) (discussing the unavoidable-injury standard and providing examples of
companies’ common arguments that have been rejected by courts and the FTC).
265. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 1988); Orkin
Exteriminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 266 (1986) (“Consumers may act to avoid injury before it
occurs if they have reason to anticipate the impending harm and the means to avoid it.” (emphasis
added)).
266. See infra notes 304–06 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
269. Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 263 (“Whether some consequence is
‘reasonably avoidable’ depends, not just on whether people know the physical steps to take in
order to prevent it, but also on whether they understand the necessity of actually taking those
steps.”).
270. The six practices include the following: (1) usurious interest rates; (2) short maturity
dates; (3) single balloon payments; (4) multiple rollover or refinancing fees; (5) multiple
back-to-back loans; and (6) repetitive electronic bank-account access.
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admit that the loans cater to people with no other choice to resolve unexpected
monetary shortages.271 Furthermore, many borrowers admit that they do not
understand the APR associated with payday lending or the risks arising from
defaulting on quickly approaching loan-repayment dates.272 The lack of choice
is understandable given the ubiquitous presence of payday lenders in lowincome and minority neighborhoods,273 the dearth of mainstream financial
institutions in these neighborhoods,274 the millions of dollars spent on
advertising by payday lenders,275 and the consumers’ urgent need for
immediate cash.276
One might argue that borrowers could obtain a loan from a credit union, ask
their creditors for time extensions on payments, or seek the assistance of a
These possible options have
consumer credit-counseling agency.277
weaknesses and may be largely theoretical for payday borrowers. The
“reasonably avoidable” determination depends on whether consumers are

271. See, e.g., Carrie Dann, Group Says Payday Lenders Spent $2.1M Lobbying in 2008,
NAT’L J. (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/group-says-paydaylenders-spent-2-1m-lobbying-in-2008-20090424, available at 2009 WLNR 7767921; Mediha
Fejzagic DiMartino, Debt’s Vicious Cycle, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL. (Ontario, Cal.) (Apr. 2,
2011, 6:35 AM), http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_17758730?source=most_viewed (interviewing
customers at a payday-loan store who “admitted no other options were available to address their
monthly financial obligations”).
272. See DiMartino, supra note 271 (reporting that California borrowers “are aware of the
fees associated with payday loans, but they do not understand the [APR] that is associated with
long-term borrowing”); see also Martin, supra note 37, at 611–12 (reporting that a borrower,
acting on her mother’s advice, opted for a payday loan, rather than a student loan, even though
student loans have APRs between 0% and 8.5%).
273. See LI ET AL., supra note 260, at 10; see also TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19
(finding that payday-loan and car-title stores greatly outnumber traditional lenders in one of the
poorest neighborhoods in Houston, Texas and suggesting that consumers may use these lenders
because of “aggressive advertising and plentiful payday and auto title loan store locations,” rather
than the “capacity of a payday or auto title loan to meet borrower needs”).
274. See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19; LI ET AL., supra note 260, at 10.
275. See, e.g., TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 76, at 19; Jim DuPlessis, Industry Tightens Rules
in an Attempt to Head Off Regulation, Lenders to Tout Education, Limit Ads, STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Feb. 22, 2007, at C8, available at 2007 WLNR 3434932 (reporting that payday lenders
budgeted $10 million for their publicity blitz).
276. See, e.g., Kevin Flowers, Payday Lenders Targeted, ERIE TIMES-NEWS (Pa.), Apr. 2,
2006, at 1 (reporting that payday lenders “often prey[] on low-income and minority borrowers,
who may have few other options when they desperately need money” and that they are “prevalent
in minority neighborhoods”); Jake Lewis, Taming the Banking Predators, MULTINAT’L
MONITOR, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 27, 28 (“Predatory lenders use door-to-door solicitations, phone
calls and mailings to badger homeowners into refinancing their existing loans to obtain cash.
This is a tempting idea for families on low and moderate incomes and strapped for cash, but an
expensive remedy laced with high interest charges and fees which ultimately strip away what
little equity remains in the house.”).
277. See Martin, supra note 37, at 612–13 (discussing alternatives to payday loans).
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knowledgeable about what options they can exercise to avoid the harm.278 One
poll shows that many high school students do not even know about the
existence of credit unions, let alone the membership-eligibility requirements.279
The general public’s lack of knowledge may be attributed to credit unions’
traditional practice of restricting memberships to people employed in a limited
number of professions, which excluded many Americans from credit-union
services.280 For consumers who are aware of their eligibility to join a credit
union, some may not (1) qualify for a loan; (2) find credit unions that offer
low-cost loans; or (3) secure a loan in enough time to deal with the financial
crisis.
Consumers could try negotiating with a creditor directly or seek the
assistance of a credit counselor. Generally, creditors do not have a good
reputation for being willing to work with consumers who are unable to pay
their debts.281 Credit counselors are willing to work with consumers, but they
are limited in what they can accomplish for consumers because they only
handle unsecured debt and primarily credit-card debt.282 Moreover, a
consumer may not find a legitimate counselor in sufficient time to handle the
financial crisis. Because the credit-counseling industry is rife with for-profit
companies known for scamming consumers, some consumers will get
defrauded because they are unable to ascertain the legitimacy of such
counselors.283

278. Cf. Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1066 (1984) (noting that knowledge of the steps
for avoiding injury is not enough for the injury to be reasonably avoidable; rather, the consumer
must also understand and appreciate the necessity of taking those steps).
279. See, e.g., Poll: Only 15% of H.S. Students Aware of CU Difference, CUNA (June 24,
2011), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/11/system062311-2.html (reporting that not only are high
school students ignorant of credit unions, but “the majority of [the 900] students responding to the
survey (60%) believe that credit card companies often entice people into taking on more debt than
they can handle”).
280. See What Is the Credit Union Difference?, CUNA, http://www.cuna.org/gov_affairs/
legislative/cu_difference.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); see also Joe Rauch, Jax
Federal Credit Union to Serve More Residents, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J.
(Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2006/01/30/story2.html?page
=all (reporting that Jax Federal Credit Union recently expanded its membership beyond federal
employees to anyone who lives in nearby counties).
281. The current protracted foreclosure crisis, in which horror stories abound regarding
mortgage companies stringing homeowners along with unfulfilled promises to modify their
mortgage loans to prevent foreclosure, evidences creditors’ unwillingness to negotiate. See, e.g.,
Kenneth R. Harney, FTC Targeting Foreclosure-Prevention Scams, Thousands of Homeowners
in U.S. Have Been Victimized, BALT. SUN, Sept. 13, 2009, at 4.
282. See, e.g., FTC, FISCAL FITNESS: CHOOSING A CREDIT COUNSELOR 3 (2011), available
at http://www.ponyexpr.com/cre26.pdf.
283. See Rana Cash, Not All Credit Services Are Equal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 27, 2010,
at D1 (reporting that illegitimate credit counselors have names very similar to reputable ones,
which prompted the reputable Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Greater Atlanta to change
its name to CredAbility); Press Release, Rob McKenna, Attorney Gen., McKenna Warns
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The weaknesses in the aforementioned possible options suggest that
consumers do not have an informed choice and, therefore, that the injury from
payday loans is unavoidable.
These same options were available to military borrowers, yet Congress
passed the Military Lending Act (MLA) to protect military borrowers.284
Congress relied on a 2006 Department of Defense (DOD) report when passing
the MLA, which clearly states that “[a]lternatives to payday loans and high
interest installment loans are available through the Military Aid Societies and
through several banks and many credit unions located on or near military
installations.”285 Yet, the DOD report concluded that the existence of these
low-cost loans and financial counseling efforts were insufficient to keep
military borrowers from obtaining payday loans: “Education, counseling,
assistance from Aid Societies, and sound alternatives are necessary but not
sufficient to protect Service members from predatory lending practices or
products that are aggressively marketed to consumers in general and to
military personnel directly.”286 The report concludes unequivocally that
“statutory protections are necessary to protect Service members from unfair,
deceptive lending practices and usurious interest rates.”287
Along with the DOD report’s findings, the actions of Congress, state
legislatures, and prudential regulators confirm the conclusion that many
payday-loan practices are unfair because they cause substantial and reasonably
unavoidable harm to consumers that outweighs any potential benefit. For
example, MLA regulations and several state statutes cap the APR on payday
loans at 36% or less,288 and the NCUA caps the APR on payday loans by
federal credit unions at 28%.289 Similarly, the FDIC small-dollar-loan pilot
program capped the APR on participating banks’ small-dollar loans at 36%,
and banks participating in the program reported APRs below 36% even after
factoring origination fees into the APR calculation.290 Notably, the FDIC pilot
Consumers About Debt-Relief Scams (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/
pressrelease.aspx?id=23146.
284. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006); see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
285. DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 5 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 46.
288. 32 C.F.R. § 232.4(b) (2008); e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2010) (capping the APR 28%).
289. NCUA Short-Term, Small Amount Loans Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,285, 58,286 (Sept. 24,
2010). After considering comments about lower and higher APRs, the NCUA decided to adopt a
rule using a “an APR 1000 basis points above the Board approved interest rate ceiling,” thereby
capping the APR at 28%. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a), 124
Stat. 1376, 2012–13 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a) (Supp. IV 2010))
(subjecting non-banks and mainstream financial institutions to state enforcement actions
depending on the type of violations at issue).
290. A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, 4 FDIC Q. 28,
28 & fig.1 (2010) [hereinafter FDIC Pilot Program], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank
/analytical/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_ SmallDollar.pdf (stating that the
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program demonstrated that banks could achieve long-term profitability with
APRs capped at 36%.291
Because the CFPA prohibits the CFPB from establishing a national usury
limit, the CFPB cannot cap the APRs on payday loans at 36%.292 It can,
however, declare as unfair the practice of lenders charging an APR that
exceeds the permissible interest rate as established by applicable state and
federal laws.293 With such a declaration, a bank could not charge an activeduty soldier an APR in excess of 36%, and a federal credit union or a non-bank
lender could not charge, for example, an Ohio resident an APR greater than
28% because both institutions are subject to this APR cap.294 Financial
institutions that choose to engage in this unfair practice would, therefore, be
subject to enforcement actions by the CFPB and state attorneys general.295
In addition to APRs, the CFPB has grounds to declare other payday-loan
practices unfair. Several states, the MLA, and the NCUA ban rollovers.296
The NCUA and several states also ban multiple outstanding loans to one
borrower at a time and restrict multiple back-to-back loan transactions by
imposing cooling-off periods between loans or limiting the number of loans a
borrower can receive in a specified time frame.297 Moreover, the NCUA rules
and the FDIC pilot-program guidelines establish minimum maturity dates and
require installment payment plans to provide borrowers with a realistic time
frame and manner in which to repay the loans.298 The MLA regulations also

FDIC pilot program for small-dollar loans sought to “illustrate how banks can profitably offer
affordable small-dollar loans as an alternative to high-cost credit products”).
291. See id. at 32.
292. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(o).
293. See supra Part III.A.
294. See supra note 288–89 and accompanying text; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1321.40(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). If the CFPB broadly defines payday loans, as proposed
herein, banks would be in violation of the CFPB if they issued open-ended loans with APRs
exceeding 36% to military personnel covered under the MLA.
295. See supra Part III.A.
296. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(G) (prohibiting a lender from “[m]ak[ing] a
short-term loan to a borrower for purposes of retiring an existing short-term loan between any
licensee and that borrower”); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(4) (“The Federal credit union must not
roll-over any STS [short-term, small] loan.”); 32 C.F.R. §§ 232.1(a), 232.8(a)(1) (2008)
(declaring it unlawful under the MLA if a lender “rolls over, renews, repays, refinances, or
consolidates any consumer credit extended to the covered borrower by the same creditor with the
proceeds of other consumer credit extended by that creditor to the same covered borrower, unless
the new transaction results in more favorable terms to the covered borrower”).
297. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(E) (prohibiting a licensed lender from
“[m]ak[ing] a short-term loan to a borrower if there exists an outstanding loan between the
licensee and that borrower”); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(3) (limiting lenders to three short-term
loans in a six-month period and to only one outstanding loan per borrower at a given time).
298. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(2) (requiring that a “loan ha[ve] a minimum maturity term
of one month”); id. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(5) (“The Federal credit union fully amortizes the loan.”);
FDIC Pilot Program, supra note 290, at 28 (recommending a loan term of ninety days or more).
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limit the lender’s ability to electronically access the borrower’s account unless
the loan meets certain criteria, including an APR cap at 36%.299
In summary, lawmakers’ and regulators’ actions establish the six
problematic characteristics of payday loans to be unfair, and such
characteristics, therefore, should be banned outright or restricted. As a
consequence, the CFPB will be on sure footing if it declares the following
practices to be unfair and thereby unlawful: (1) usurious interest rates; (2) short
maturity dates; (3) single balloon payments; (4) multiple rollover or
refinancing fees; (5) multiple back-to-back loans; and (6) repetitive electronic
bank-account access. These practices are reasonably unavoidable and inflict
substantial injury to consumers that is not outweighed by benefits to them.
2. Deceptive Practices Mislead Consumers
In addition to declaring some practices unfair, the CFPB should declare
some common payday practices to be deceptive.300 The CFPA does not define
a deceptive act or practice.301 However, because the CFPA adopted the FTC
Act’s definition of unfair,302 it seems logical that the CFPB adoption of the
FTC Act’s definition of deceptive would be appropriate. The FTC Act defines
a deceptive act as “a representation, omission, or practice, . . . that is likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and . . . the
representation, omission, or practice is material.”303
Multiple rollovers, refinancings, and back-to-back loans are typical payday
loan practices that should satisfy the definition of deceptive.304 When
borrowers are unable to pay the entire loan by the original due date, payday
lenders either impose a rollover or refinancing fee or require a back-to-back
loan transaction in states where rollovers or refinancings are technically
banned.305 However, the fees charged to do a rollover, refinancing, or back-to299. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(5).
300. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2010)) (authorizing the CFPB to “prescribe
rules applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive,
or abusive acts or practices”).
301. See id. § 1031 (defining “unfair” and “abusive”).
302. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
303. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984) (citing FTC Policy Statement on
Deception from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Rep. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Policy
Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm).
304. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50 (reporting that after an online lender debited a
consumer’s bank account for $60 to $70 every two weeks for two months to cover a $300 loan,
the lender refused to tell the consumer the amount still owed and tried to persuade her to continue
making rollover payments).
305. See, e.g., Ryan Keith, State May Muzzle Payday Lenders; Loan Stores Wary of
Proposed Rules, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 28, 2000, at 1 (reporting that one former
manager of a payday loan store in the greater Chicago area stated that his company encouraged
borrowers to get rollovers to the degree that borrowers paid “five times as much in fees above
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back loan do not count toward reducing the principal of the loan and often total
several times the original loan amount.306 Some customers believe that these
charges reduce the outstanding amount owed and are surprised, after months or
even years of paying fees, that the payday lender still insists that the original
loan amount is due.307 A lender’s contractual and verbal omissions regarding
the function and the application of such fees are materially misleading to
consumers who are acting reasonably and thus meet the standard for a
deceptive practice.308 The consumers’ expectation that the fee payments apply
to their outstanding loans is reasonable given that other traditional forms of
consumer credit allow for partial payments and a way to pay a sufficient
amount to reduce the principal and interest.309 In fact, the deceptive practices
of encouraging multiple rollovers or issuing back-to-back loans are considered
so harmful to consumers that many states, the NCUA, and the MLA ban
them.310 Consequently, the CFPB has a reasonable basis to declare these
practices deceptive and, therefore, unlawful.
A lender’s use of demand drafts or repetitive electronic debits to the
borrower’s bank account for rollover or finance fees is another practice that
also should meet the definition of deceptive. For example, one payday-loan
lender relies on the following contract language and thus uses demand drafts to
drain the borrower’s bank account: “While you may revoke the authorization
to effect . . . debit entries at any time up to 3 business days prior to the [loan’s]
due date, you may not revoke the authorization to prepare and submit checks
on your behalf until such time as the loan is paid in full.”311 This practice
counters the average consumer’s ability to stop payment on checks or revoke
their original loan amount”); see supra Part I.B. In Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., Wilma Ruby obtained a
$500 payday loan from Cashnet. 708 S.E.2d 871, 873 (Va. 2011). Unable to pay the debt and her
monthly expenses on time, Ms. Ruby went to Cashnet each month for two and a half years, paid
off her $500 principal plus a $75 finance charge, and immediately obtained a new $500 loan. Id.
at 874. To circumvent Virginia’s ban on rollovers and refinancings, Cashnet claimed that it had
issued Ms. Ruby thirty-three “new” loans over that period. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that “Cashnet’s practice of making a loan to Ruby immediately after she repaid a previous
loan was a refinancing or renewal under Code § 6.2–1816(6)(i) and, therefore, in violation of the
Act.” Id. at 875.
306. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (reporting the story of Bonnie Bernhardt,
a borrower who paid a grand total of $1600 for a $300 loan from an online payday lender); see
also Keith, supra note 305, at 1.
307. See, e.g., Sorenson, supra note 50 (reporting that a borrower thought she had paid off a
$300 loan from an online lender after the lender debited her bank account for $60 to $70 every
two weeks for two months).
308. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. at 164–65; see also supra note 49.
309. See Payday Lenders: Small Loans, Hefty Fees, Big Problem, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG
(Jan. 2009), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/viewpoint/small-loan-bigproblems/overview/small-loan-big-trouble-ov.htm.
310. See supra Part II.
311. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Hearing, supra note 48, at 92 (statement of
Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (emphasis added).
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debit authorizations.312 Moreover, the payday lenders’ practice of withdrawing
only the rollover fee or finance charge from the bank account keeps the
borrower indebted and burdens the borrower with determining how to pay the
loan in full to cease electronic access.313 Again, this practice is so egregious
that the MLA bans electronic access unless the loan transaction actually
complies with the MLA, under which rollovers are banned.314 As a result, the
CFPB should declare as deceptive and unlawful demand drafts and any means
of electronic access that are set up to withdraw only rollover fees or finance
charges, or that violate federal and state restrictions on payday loans. This
declaration would also include banning banks and non-banks from requiring
consumers to agree to debit authorizations to obtain a loan.315
3. Abusive Practices Take Unreasonable Advantage of Consumers
The CFPB should also use its authority to declare the problematic
characteristics of payday loans to be abusive. Under the CFPA, the CFPB can
declare an act abusive if it “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer
to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or
service.”316 The CFPB can also declare an act abusive if it
takes unreasonable advantage of(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person
to act in the interests of the consumer.317
Although the CFPB may declare all of the problematic aspects of payday
loans to be abusive, this section focuses on one practice that, heretofore, has
not been discussed: the practice of payday lenders failing to assess the
borrower’s ability to repay.318 Non-bank payday lenders advertise that they do
312. See id.
313. See DOD REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 251, at 16.
314. See 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(5) (2008).
315. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (asserting that lenders require consumers to
agree to debit authorizations); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON,
supra note 26, at 26 (urging bank regulators to impose a “prohibition against [lenders] securing
the loans through electronic access to a bank account—which means that recipients cannot be
required to agree to electronic repayment, and for those who have agreed, they should be
permitted to at any time stop the bank’s access without cost from seizing funds from their
account[s]”).
316. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1) (Supp. 2010)).
317. Id. § 1031(d)(2).
318. Id. § 1031(d).
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not perform credit checks and that consumers can obtain a loan with as little
documentation as a driver’s license, a pay stub, and a checking-account
statement.319 Similarly, banks issue their versions of payday loans so long as
the customer has a bank account set up with automatic deposit of income
checks.320 By failing to assess the consumer’s ability to repay and by
providing loans on the barest of documentation without undergoing a
traditional credit check, lenders knowingly lead consumers to obtain a loan
transaction in which they are destined to fail and thereby suffer substantial
economic harm. Therefore, the CFPB should prohibit as abusive the practice
of issuing loans without doing an assessment of a borrower’s ability to repay.
Such a declaration would be consistent with several state regulations requiring
payday lenders to do some type of assessment321 and the FDIC pilot program
and NCUA rule, which require the development of and adherence to guidelines
Even the OCC’s regulations prohibit
for underwriting standards.322
asset-based lending,323 and its guidelines for safety and soundness require a
national bank to “assess the ability of the borrower to repay the indebtedness in
a timely manner.”324
Undeniably, requiring lenders to assess the borrower’s ability to pay will
prompt lenders to refuse to issue loans to some borrowers. However, easy
319. Kim Christensen, Hooked on Debt: A Middle-Class Move to Payday Lenders, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1; see also Satz, supra note 37, at 128 (stating that “payday lenders
typically require a driver’s license, paystub or other proof of income, bank statement, telephone
bill, and checkbook”).
320. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RUNAWAY BANDWAGON, supra note 26, at 16.
321. See, e.g., 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(f)(3) (2010) (“A lender must make a good faith
effort to assess the borrower’s ability to repay the payday loan or deferred presentment
transaction under the loan terms.”).
322. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(iii)(8) (2011) (“The Federal credit union includes, in its written
lending policies, a limit on the aggregate dollar amount of loans made under this section of a
maximum of 20% of net worth and implements appropriate underwriting guidelines to minimize
risk; for example, requiring a borrower to verify employment by producing at least two recent pay
stubs.”); FDIC Pilot Program, supra note 290, at 28.
323. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(B) (2011) (“A national bank shall not make a consumer loan
subject to this § 7.4008 based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or
liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the
loan according to its terms. A bank may use any reasonable method to determine a borrower’s
ability to repay, including, for example, the borrower’s current and expected income, current and
expected cash flows, net worth, other relevant financial resources, current financial obligations,
employment status, credit history, or other relevant factors.”). In the context of this article,
asset-based lending includes banks conditioning payday loans upon the borrowers setting up
automatic deposits of income checks and agreeing to debit authorization to facilitate payment.
Asset-based lending also includes non-banks issuing loans, claiming post-dated checks as
collateral, and requiring debit authorization to facilitate payment.
324. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL 2003-2,
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING
PRACTICES 7 n.22 (2003) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 30 App. A (2002)), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2003
/advisory-letter-2003-2.pdf.
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access to credit is not appropriate if the borrower is destined to default. Denial
of loans may sometimes lead the consumer to consider more feasible
options.325 Consider, for example, a single mother with a past-due utility bill
who is denied a payday loan. If the CFPB requires lenders to provide a list of
social-services organizations to consumers who are denied a loan, the single
mother may learn that she qualifies for social programs, such as the Low
Income Energy Assistance Program, which would allow her to avoid
entrapment in a payday-loan debt cycle.326
D. Additional Considerations for CFPB Action
A few additional considerations arise regarding the CFPB’s ability to declare
payday loan characteristics as unfair, deceptive, or abusive, and, thereby,
unlawful. For instance, if federal lawmakers successfully reduce funding to
the CFPB,327 then adoption of regulations like those this Article proposes will
be crucial for empowering states to pursue enforcement actions against all
financial institutions in noncompliance with the regulations.328 Before the
Dodd-Frank Act, the prudential regulators’ use of the federal preemption
doctrine to insulate banks severely hindered states in their attempts to hold
banks accountable for their violations of state consumer-protection laws.329
Now, under the CFPA, state regulators and attorneys general may assert the
CFPB’s enforcement authority against a national bank or federal savings
association for violating “a regulation prescribed by the [CFPB] under a
provision of this title and to secure remedies under provisions of this title or
remedies otherwise provided under other law.”330 As for non-banks, state
attorneys general may pursue enforcement for violations of both the CFPA and
any rules adopted by the CFPB, and state banking regulators can seek penalties
against any institutions chartered, incorporated, or licensed in their states to
enforce both the CFPA and the CFPB’s rules.331 Accordingly, state regulators
and attorneys general can act to protect consumers even if the CFPB is
hampered financially from pursuing enforcement actions.332
325. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 37, at 611–13.
326. See Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS.-ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/liheap
/about/factsheet.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2011).
327. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
328. This Article leaves for future discussion whether threats to weaken the CFPB’s authority
and the 2012 presidential election results will hinder the CFPB from enforcing the regulations
proposed herein against payday lenders and large financial institutions.
329. See FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 2, at 22–24.
330. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–13 (2010)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a) (Supp. IV 2010)).
331. Id. § 1042(a)(1).
332. In another article, the author discusses how the CFPB can use its authority to issue
guidelines and a policy statement to motivate lenders to discontinue the predatory payday-lending
practices discussed herein and grant a safe harbor from enforcement actions to lenders who
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IV. CONCLUSION
Imagine that drug manufacturers had put into the market a drug that
seriously injured or killed 30% of its 100,000 users. Would the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) allow the drug to stay on the market if the
manufacturers placed crystal clear, plain-language disclosures in the drug
packaging about the high risks of serious injury or death? Of course
not—drugs have been pulled off the shelf for far fewer incidents of serious
injury or death out of concern for the physical safety of consumers.333
A consumer’s financial well-being deserves basic protection, just as his or
her physical well-being. Substantial financial hardship is the equivalent of
serious physical injury; yet, some federal lawmakers and banking regulators
think that it is acceptable to allow banks and non-banks to flood
low-to-moderate income communities with payday loans, one of the most
dangerous consumer-credit products on the market today. Persuaded, perhaps,
that financial disclosures are sufficient, some politicians and banking
regulators allow payday lending to occur in the face of evidence that the
majority of payday borrowers get trapped in a cycle of debt and suffer
substantial financial hardship, such as delaying receipt of important services,
postponing prescription drug purchases, losing access to their bank accounts,
and experiencing disconnection of utility services. Some borrowers are even
forced to file bankruptcy to obtain relief from payday-loan debt.
Despite the unwillingness of some federal lawmakers and regulators to
restrict the predatory aspects of payday lending directly, the newly created
CFPB has the chance to act similarly to the FDA and protect consumers from
payday loans. The CFPB should adopt regulations declaring several common
payday-loan practices as unfair, deceptive, and abusive and, therefore,
unlawful. As a result of these declarations, the CFPB may ban predatory
payday-loan practices, such as charging usurious interest rates, requiring single
balloon payments, demanding short maturity dates, and requiring multiple
rollovers or loans. These declarations will force bank and non-bank lenders
either to make payday-loan products safer and affordable or withdraw from the
payday-loan business. Banks and credit unions that already offer affordable
loan alternatives to payday loans can continue to emerge as responsible lenders
to make the payday-loan market more fair and competitive.

demonstrate a commitment to offering affordable loans to consumers. See generally Johnson,
supra note 82.
333. See, e.g., MSU Researcher Studies Ties Between Cholesterol Drugs, Muscle Problems,
MICH. ST. UNIV. (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://news.msu.edu/story/5716/ (reporting that in
2001, the FDA recalled the drug Baycol after it appeared to cause thirty-one deaths from a
condition known as rhabdomyolysis).

